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For almost three quarters of a century the South Tyroleans had fought for the 
preservation of their ethnic identity. The idea of self-determination introduced by 
Woodrow Wilson in 1918 legitimized their quest for protection of their ethnicity and 
language. Yet, the peace of Paris of 1919 denied the South Tyrolens' the right to self-
determination and incorporated the German-speaking territory of the South Tyrol into Italy. 
During the following two decades Italian fascism eliminated the South Tyroleans' right to 
struggle for their cultural identity. Mussolini's ideology pursued the ltalianization of the 
South Tyrol. The German-speaking minority in Italy could not even hope for help from the 
German national socialists in the north who during the 1930's renounced the South Tyrol 
for an alliance with Italy. During the fascist era minorities were not a problem for the 
dictatorial states. Minority rights were simply ignored. Only the peace conference in 
1945/46 gave the European minorities a new chance to fight for their protection. The South 
Tyroleans hoped again that the peacemakers would allow a return of the South Tyrol to 
Austria. During the peace negotiations, however, political realities in Europe changed and 
the rising conflict between East and West urged the Western powers to confirm the decision 
of 1919 and to maintain the South Tyrol within Italy. Although the Allied powers 
recognized the ethnic difference of the South Tyroleans from the Italian people, they also 
explicitly forbade the application of self-determination to the German-speaking minority on 
Italy's northern frontier. Consequently the decision of 1946 confronted the South 
Tyroleans with the need to negotiate for a different kind of self-determination, for a 
determination of their fate within the Italian state. 
The Italian government now expressed its goodwill to come to satisfying terms with 
its German-speaking minority in the north. Yet, Italy's treatment of the South Tyrol 
~I 
question after the Peace Conference in 1946, reverted to opposite measures. Italy tired to 
obstruct the implementation of the guarantees given in a bilateral agreement between Italy 
and Austria in 1946. Thus, the Italian government opened the way to the endless 
discussions that only ended in 1993. During this time, however, the South Tyrolean 
representatives achieved an autonomy for the German-speaking people on Italy's northern 
frontier. During these decades the South Tyroleans had the chance to adapt the autonomy 
to present-day needs and ultimately achieved an autonomy that protected the uniqueness of 
their people much better than neither an agreement in 1919 nor in 1945 could have 
anticipated. 
Today, the South Tyroleans are among the best protected minorities in Europe. 
They determine their own political future and administer their province by themselves. 
Although sometimes Italian-speaking and German-speaking inhabitants guard each other 
with suspicion the tendencies to live together, rather than to live side by side, increase 
steadily. The South Tyrolean autonomy which provides the German-speaking minority in 
Italy with the possibility of self-government and ethnic protection, could indeed become an 
example to many other European minorities. Their case could help solve the various 
problems arising in post-cold war Europe where many minorities, whose rights had been 
suppressed for decades, now demand protection of their ethnicity and self-determination. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The end of World War I marked the beginning of the question of the South 
Tyrolean minority which repeatedly raised the interest of the European political scene for 
the following decades. For centuries the area in dispute had been part of the Duchy of 
Tyrol. In the thirteenth century the Counts of Tyrol liberated the territory from Church 
dependence which had reigned over the area ever since the Carolingians had integrated it 
into the Holy Roman Empire in 788. In 1342 the Tyrol received its first Charter which 
recognized the existing privileges of the Tyrolean Estates, protected the Tyroleans from 
unusual taxation, and prevented a strong foreign influence on the area. The Charter became 
part of the Tyrolean constitution and was later, in 1406 and 1511, extended into the field of 
military affairs. Historian have argued that this Charter, which gave the Tyroleans a say in 
their own affairs was unprecedented in feudal Europe and formed the basis of the 
Tyroleans' strong feeling of a right to dispose of themselves. I 
As early as 1364, duchess Margaret Maultasch had decided that in case of the 
absence of an adequate heir the duchy should be transferred to the rule of the Dukes of 
Austria. Consequently, the Tyrol became an important link between the Austrian and 
Swiss possessions of the Hapsburgs and remained under the Austro-Germanic sphere of 
influence for the following five and one half centuries. Yet, the Tyrol not only connected 
east and west, the area was also an important link between the Germanic north and the 
Italian south. Already during the fourteenth century Italians had begun to immigrate to the 





Margravate Trent area, the territory south of the Tyrol. The trade connections between 
Trent, the capital of the Margravate Trent, and Bozen, the main city of the southern part of 
the Tyrol were manifold and contributed to economic wealth. Consequently, the 
population along the trade lines between the two cities became increasingly mixed. This 
free inter-mingling declined after the first Italian attempts to bring the Margravate Trent 
under Italian political dominion. The attempt failed when the Hapsburgs successfully 
ended the wars between them and the Republic of Venice in the fifteenth century. But 
Austrian expansion south and Italian expansion north slowed down considerably. The 
gorge of Salum became the ethnic boundary between the German-speaking and the Italian-
speaking world. 2 
During the following centuries the Renaissance propelled the Italians' 
aggressiveness against the north. While the inhabitamts of the area south of Salum 
increasingly leaned towards an inclusion into the Italian world, the population in the area 
north of the ethnic gorge became one of then most loyal supporters of the House of 
Hapsburg. A third ethnic group lived along the ethnic border, the Ladins. They were the 
remainders of an ancient Rhaeto-Roman culture which had survived in some valleys in the 
mountains. The Ladins, although linguistically closer to the Italian language were divided 
between the two worlds, but the majority drifted towards the German-speaking world in 
the north. During Joseph II's reign in the 1780's and 1790's the Hapsburg emperor tried 
to create a more centralized state and sought unsuccessfully to introduce German as the 
only official language. Instead, a different practice took shape. Henceforth, public 
officials in German-speaking areas were supposed to be Austrian-German, in Italian-
speaking areas Italian, and in mixed areas bilingual. This division remained official until 
the breakdown of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. 3 
2 Alcock, History, 6-7. 
3 Alcock, History, 8-9. 
L_ - - - - - - - - - - -
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During the nineteenth century the Tyrol was exposed to the Napoleonic wars. In 
1809 the Tyroleans who had gathered under the leadership of a native farmer's son from 
the southern part of the country, Andreas Hofer, were able to defend their duchy twice 
against the Napoleonic army. But the peace of Schonbrunn in 1810 brought the territory 
temporarily under French influence. Andreas Hofer, who had become the Tyrolean 
national hero, was captured and shot on February 20, 1810. The Tyrol was divided into 
three parts. The territory south of Bozen became the "Dipartimento Alto Adige"4 of the 
Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy, the eastern part came under French dominion, and the rest 
was annexed by Bavaria.5 During the peace negotiations of 1919 the Italian government 
would historically claim the southern part of the Tyrol referring to this short period of 
Italian reign during the era of Napoleon. By 1814, however, the Tyrol had been reunited 
with Austria. Emperor Francis I united the Margravate Trent with the Tyrol to form one 
Crown Province. 6 
Yet the Napoleonic years had left an indelible stamp on the European world. The 
rise of nationalism propelled the ethnic and cultural separation of the multinational empires 
and the unification of ethnically identical regions. In 1871, the idea of unifying all 
German-speaking people into one state helped creating the first German Reich. In Italy the 
"Risorgimento," the idea of the "rebirth" of the Italian state launched the Italian's drive for 
independence and national unity. The unsatisfactory results of the war in 1866, which led 
to Italian unification, exempted the Trentino from an incorporation into Italian political 
dominion. With the entry into the Triple Alliance in 1882, Italy officially renounced its 
"territoria irredenta," the still not liberated Italian territories which included the southern 
part of the German-speaking Tyrol. Henceforth, Italian irredentism continued on a cultural 
level. In the Trentino, the province south of Salum, the cultural affinity with the 
4 "Department Upper Adige," Adige is the main river in the southern part of the Tyrol. 
5 Alcock, History, 9. 
6 Alcock, History, 9. 
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neighboring areas was the strongest and the area therefore became the center of Italian 
irredentist movements. 7 
Until 1914 Italy stood faithful to its Alliance with Germany and the Austro-
Hungarian empire. As the war broke out, however, Italy refused to enter the war on her 
Allies' side because the Alliance was a defensive one and the attack on Serbia was an 
offensive action. During the following months Italy negotiated both with the members of 
the Triple Alliance in Vienna and with the members of the Triple Entente in London. 
Vienna offered territorial concessions, including the Trentino, for Italy's neutrality in this 
war. Yet, the offer that London made was more advantageous. Italy could name her price 
for her entry into the war on the Entente's side and the Entente was careful of promising 
Italy areas that were within the enemy's territory. On April 26, 1915, France, Great 
Britain, and Italy signed the secret Treaty of London wherein the two Western Allies of the 
Entente promised Italy not only the Trentino and territories along the Dalmatian cost, but 
also the German-speaking part of the Tyrol south of the Brenner. Consequently, after a 
victory against Austria-Hungary and Germany Italy would incorporate about 200.000 
German-speaking people into its nation. On May 4 Italy broke off the negotiations with 
Vienna and denounced the Triple Alliance. A month after the signing of the Treaty of 
London Italy entered the war on the side of the Entente. 
1919 not only marked the end of a World War, it also marked the end of an era. 
The principles that had led the world to the disruptions of 1914 broke down. The powers 
arising during the war denounced imperialism and the pre-war alliance system. The 
American President, Woodrow Wilson, introduced a new line of action. In 1917 he began 
his campaign for a post-war world without imperialist powers and secret alliances, a world 
where the peoples could choose their own form of government, hopefully democracy. 
7 Alcock, History, 12-13. 
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During 1918, the Wilsonian principles became the guidelines for the future peace in Europe 
and many peoples looked forward to a settlement that would secure a long-lasting peace for 
Europe. 
Wilson propelled the idea of self-determination which in his eyes was the 
possibility of each nation to decide its own political, democratic future. He denied the 
validity of any secret agreements that had been made during the war for the future 
settlement in Europe. Therefore, the German-speaking inhabitants of the southern Tyrol, 
whose territory had been occupied by Italian forces claiming the Brenner frontier_ as 
promised to them in the secret Treaty of London, believed that Italian occupation of their 
territory would not last long. As did so many other minorities, in Europe they looked up to 
Wilson and the principles that guided the peace. Yet, as it turned out, Wilson's idealism 
counteracted the prevailing European realities. The American President was not familiar 
with the ethnographic complexity in Europe and was not aware of the profundity of ethnic 
conflicts. Disregarding his own principle of self-determination, Wilson conceded the 
South Tyrol to Italy at a very early stage during the negotiations in 1918/19 and thus 
introduced a minority problem that would raise international interest several times during 
the following decades. 
The South Tyrol did neither receive the benefit of self-determination nor was the 
territory reincorporated into Austria. The peace of 1919 ceded the South Tyrol to Italy and 
thus provided the Italian state with a German-speaking minority on its northern border. 
Ever since then, the South Tyrolean minority fought Italian governments for the 
preservation of its language, culture, and tradition. This paper seeks to trace the South 
Tyroleans' struggle for some kind of self-determination during the following decades. In 
the beginning the South Tyroleans saw a return to Austria as the only possible solution of 
their dilemma. But in 1945/46 a second European peace conference confirmed the cession 
of the South Tyrol to Italy and the South Tyroleans recognized the need of a fight for a 
different kind of self-determination. While radical parties within the South Tyrol now 
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turned to demand the creation of an own South Tyrolean state, the official representatives 
of the South Tyrol began to negotiate with the Italian government for an autonomy for the 
South Tyrolean minority. 
After decades of often unsuccessful discussions the Italian government finally, in 
1969, provided the South Tyroleans with a set of provisions which were supposed to 
secure the German-speaking Tyroleans' cultural identity. During the following two 
decades the Italian government gradually fulfilled the promises given in 1969. In 1992 the 
representatives of the German-speaking minority in northern Italy officially declared that 
the provisions of the Italian government guaranteed a free development of the South 
Tyroleans. Thus the South Tyrol had achieved administrative, jurisdictional, and cultural 
self-determination to a degree unprecedented in the European multiethnic states. For the 
South Tyroleans self-determination therefore did not consist in the right to determine their 
own political fate. Self-determination became the struggle for the preservation of the South 
Tyroleans' ethnic identity within the Italian state. Even though the final solution of the 
South Tyrol problem was far removed from the original perception of self-determination of 
the peoples, the concession of autonomy to the South Tyroleans realized one satisfactory 
form of self-determination for minorities within their host state. 
Introduction 
CHAPTER II 
THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION AS APPLIED 
TO THE SOUTH TYROL IN 1919 
On May 29, 1919 the peace negotiators in Paris submitted their final statement 
concerning the northern Italian frontier. Italy received the German-speaking territory of the 
South Tyrol which had been promised to her in the Treaty of London. In addition, she 
obtained the areas of Travis and the Sexten Valley.8 These proposals were included in the 
draft of the Peace Treaty that the Council of Four handed to the Austrian Delegation in Paris 
on June 2, 1919. This draft demanded that Austria accept three irrevocable facts: the 
cession of southern Tyrol to Italy, the inclusion of the Sudeten Germans into the newly 
created Czechoslovakia, and the rejection of a union between Austria and Germany.9 
Thus, contrary to the principles upon which the peace negotiations were based, the 
culturally, historically and ethnically German-speaking South Tyrol became part of Italy. 
The decision stood in complete opposition to President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen 
Points and his principle of self-determination. Wilson himself had contributed largely to 
this settlement and thus denied the South Tyrolese to determine their future political fate. 
In the secret Treaty of London, April 26, 1915, Great Britain and France had 
promised Italy territories of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy for its intervention into the 
war on the Allies' side. Italy demanded "the line of the Alps" from Switzerland, across the 
chief Alpine mountain crest to the Golf of Fiume. I O On its north-eastern frontier Italy 
8 Federico Curato, La Conferenza de/la Pace 1919-1920, vol. II, I Problemi ltaliani (Milano: Graf. 
A. NICOLA, 1942), 414. 
9 "Draft of June 2," June 2, 1919, in ed. Nina Almond and Ralph Haswell Lutz, The Treaty of St. 
Germain. A Documentary History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1935), 157-58. 
10 see Map I. 
8 
claimed parts of the Slavic territory including the city of Trieste, the province of Dalmatia 
and the Adriatic Islands. In this area about 700,000 Slavs would come under Italian rule.11 
Italy's northern frontier should be moved to the north as far as the Brenner Pass.12 The 
signing parties considered the Brenner Pass as a natural, geographic frontier. Thus, Italy 
would receive the territory of the Trentino, an ethnic and culturally Italian region. In 1182 
the Counts of the Tyrol had integrated the Trentino as one of the "Germanic Kingdoms." 
By the end of the nineteenth century the inhabitants of the Trentino called themselves 
"Italian Tyroleans" and more frequently even "South Tyroleans" or inhabitants of the South 
TyroI.13 The Trentino was also the center of anti-Austrian movements. Due to an 
unfavorable frontier with Austria, the Trentino had not been part of the 1866 Italian 
unification and subsequently had been the source of major irredentist uprisings against the 
Habsburg Monarchy during the following decades. 
Also, the Allies promised Italy the southern part of the Tyrol, a region of exemplary 
German-Austrian tradition. About 200,000 Austro-Germans inhabited the South Tyrol. In 
addition, about 25,000 Ladin-speaking people, the remainders of a Rhaeto-Romanic 
culture, lived in that area. In Autumn 1918 the Ladins declared: "We are not Italians, we 
never wanted to be seen as such and neither do we want to be Italians in the future. We are 
an independent people who determines its own history .... We are Tyroleans and Tyroleans 
we want to remain."14 Only about 5,000 Italians resided in the villages of the southern part 
of German-speaking South Tyrol. These Italians were mostly immigrants from the poorer 
regions of the Trentino. They spoke Italian, or rather their Trentino dialect, at home, but 
11 see Map III. 
12 see Map II. 
13 Gianni Faustini, Trentino e Tirolo dal 1000 al 1900. Breviario Storico dell" Autonomia 
(Trento: Casa Editrice Publilux, 1985), 8-10. 
14 Benedikt Erhard, ed., Option Heimat Opzioni. Eine Geschichte Siidtirols vom Gehen und 
Bleiben (Wien: 6sterreichischer Bundesverlag, 1989), 39. 
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most of them also spoke German, sent their children to German schools, and adopted the 
German farming system.15 
At the end of World War I Great Britain and France were bound to cede the areas 
promised to Italy in the Treaty of London. The United States, on the other hand, was not 
constrained by secret agreements between the Allied nations in Europe. President Wilson, 
well aware of the commitment of Great Britain and France, had himself changed the initial 
wording of an early draft of the Fourteen Points in regard to Italy. At the margin of this 
draft he wrote the words which would eventually become Point IX of the Fourteen Points: 
"Readjustment of the frontiers of Italy along clearly recognizedl6 lines of nationality."17 
Ever since Wilson's proclamation of his Fourteen Points and the principle of self-
determination, many ethnic entities and minorities in Europe looked to President Woodrow 
Wilson for a just and appropriate settlement of their territorial claims. Equally, the 
European powers, who by now regretted the commitments they had made during the war, 
relied on Woodrow Wilson to insist on the Fourteen Points and thus to annul the 
guarantees given in the secret treaties. Likewise, Austria and especially the German-
speaking minority in the South Tyrol hoped that self-determination would outweigh the 
promises made in the Treaty of London. 
Historians have argued that in the decision to cede the South Tyrol to Italy not only 
President Wilson but also Colonel House and his group of experts played a decisive role. 
Colonel Edward House, President Wilson's representative in Europe in Autumn 1917 had 
created the "Inquiry," a committee of American experts which was supposed to study the 
territorial settlements in Europe and give its advice to the American President and to the 
peace negotiators. According to the peace negotiators, the Inquiry's recommendations 
should guide the settlement of the frontier questions in Europe. Yet, neither Colonel House 
15 Erhard, Option, 33-34. 
16 In the final version of the Fourteen Points the word "recognized" changed into "recognizable." 
17 Rene Albrecht-Carrie, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 
1966), 39. 
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nor Woodrow Wilson took the Inquiry's recommendation into account in the case of the 
Italian border disputes. Also, memoranda by a variety of individuals, either by members 
of the Inquiry, or by outsiders, or even by Colonel House himself, did not exert noticeable 
influence on President Wilson. Historian Richard Schober demonstrated that Wilson was 
simply not interested in accepting advice.18 
Wilson's principle of self-determination was the driving force of the Paris Peace 
Conference. All nations entered peace negotiations with this principle in mind. Yet, self-
determination was not a strictly defined term. Scholar Michla Pomerance describes 
Wilson's self-determination as an "imprecise amalgam of several strands of thought, some 
long associated in his [Wilson's] mind with the notion 'self-government,' others newly 
hatched as a result of wartime developments, but all imbued with a general spirit of 
democracy ('consent of the governed')." Thus, Wilson held that the people had the right to 
choose their form of government, and moreover, since consent to the form of government 
was the prerequisite, the government would probably have to be democratic. 19 Already 
Wilson's Declaration of War speech on April 2, 1917, outlined these arguments. Then 
Wilson emphasized that the United States fought for "for the rights of nations great and 
small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience." 
Thus, Wilson argued that "the world must be made safe for democracy. "20 During the war 
self-determination became more inextricably interwoven with the idea that people have the 
right to choose the sovereignty under which they wanted to live. Finally, the principle was 
linked to the idea of "nationalities." The people who would choose their own destiny 
became more and more solely an ethnographic unity. Pomerance argues that this last 
interpretation was least in Wilson's mind who did not sympathize with the German idea of 
18 Richard Schober, Die Tiroler Frage auf der Friedenskonferenz von Saint Germain (Innsbruck: 
Universitiitsverlag Wagner, 1982), 61. See also William L. Langer, "The Well-Spring of our Discontents," 
in Journal of Contemporary History, 1968, 3,4:9. 
19 Michla Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice. The New Doctrine in the United 
Nations (The Hague, Boston and London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982), 1-2. 
20 Wilson's Speech for War Against Germany, in Documents of American History, 131. 
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Volk as a definition for a nation, but rather saw a nation as "a community of organization, 
of life, and of tradition. "21 
The introduction of this new principle of self-determination was not the only 
decisive factor at Paris. Historian Arnold Suppan debates that in the age of nationalism the 
term "frontier" itself experienced a significant change in its meaning. Prior to World War I, 
frontiers were determined by imperialist powers regardless of geography, ethnicity, 
language, culture or economy. During the war, however, "frontier" became a more and 
more defined term which no longer allowed an arbitrary line between two nations. 
Frontiers became political, defined by geography, security, ethnicity, political 
administration, economy and culture. Therefore strong distinctions between ethnic or 
language frontiers, economic frontiers, and strategic frontiers became essential. Moreover, 
subjective factors such as the right to self-determination, or ideological goals, such as the 
German ideal of Lebensraum, determined the decision-making on where to draw the lines 
between countries.22 The European situation, however, did not allow a simple drawing of 
the frontiers. Nor was it easy to comprehend and apply Wilson's principle of self-
determination. Self-determinaiton, as apprehended in Europe, was a mixture of race, 
community, and territorial area, each one inextricably bound to the other. 23 In addition, in 
many territories, such as the South Tyrol, no clear-cut lines could be drawn to divide two 
and three ethnic groups. In the South Tyrol, history and time had contributed in 
developing larger areas where two and three cultures lived together. Pomerance maintains, 
that due to the "messy ethnographic map in which 'the eggs were scrambled"' in Europe, 
some ethnic entities would have to be denied the right to free and "self' development. 24 
21 Pomerance, Self-Determination, 1-2. 
22 Arnold Suppan, Ethnisches, okorwmisches oder strategisches Prinzip? Aus den jugoslawischen 
Grenzziehungsvorschliigen gegeniiber Osterreich im Herbst und Winter 1918119, in ed. Isabella Ackerl and 
Rudolf Neck, Saint-Germain 1919 (Mtinchen: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1989), 113-14. 
23 Pomerance, Self-Determination, 2. 
24 Pomerance, Self-Determination, 3. 
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Nor could the decision-makers in Paris ignore other principles such as the sanctity of 
treaties, and considerations of economic, strategic, and historic value. 25 
The Italian case during the Peace Conference embraced all these factors. The secret 
Treaty of London of April 1915 led Italy to make her claims in the South Tyrol on the basis 
of the sanctity of treaties. Consequently, Italy claimed the areas promised to her in London 
in 1915 on the basis of natural right. Moreover, Italy claiming an Italian tradition in that 
territory continuously referred to the economic unity of the Trentino-South Tyrol area. 
Primarily, however, Italy maintained that its safety could only be guaranteed if the So~th 
Tyrol was made part of Italy. Also, in autumn 1918 Italy was edging toward serious 
internal crises. The public debt was gigantic. Severe inflation and reconversion swept the 
country. Most of all, Italy was tormented by a political crisis: the non-interventionists of 
1915 were gaining influence and became a serious threat to Italy's internal peace.26 The 
fulfillrnent of the Treaty of London became vital to the political stability within the nation. 
In fact, contrary to actual events, the Giornale d'ltalia already on December 7, 
1918 announced under the headline "Treaty of London Recognized" that Great Britain and 
France had unconditionally accepted the Italian claims. 27 The article spread the impression 
that the three Allies formed a united front against all opponents to Italian demands, 
especially against the United States of America. What was more important, articles like 
these manipulated Italian public opinion. In 1915 prior to Italy's entry into the war, the 
Austrian-Hungarian empire had offered Italy different regions which would actually 
coincide with Wilson's "clearly recognizable lines of nationality" and in return demanded 
nothing but Italy's neutrality. If Italy had received only what Wilson's Fourteen Points 
indicated, the nation would have fought the war in vain. It could have received the same 
amount of territory without all the human and material sacrifices. Thus, the transmission of 
25 Pomerance, Self-Determination, 5. 
26 Arno J. Meyer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking. Containment and Counterrevolution 
at Versailles, 1918-1919 (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1967), 198. 
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such messages directed Italian public opinion towards the former pro-war party. Self-
determination with all its implications was not a point of discussion, although Italy had 
recognized Wilson's ideas as the basis for peace when it signed the Armistice with 
Germany in November 1918. 
But not only Italy was a hindrance to the fulfillment of the idea of self-
determination. The experts of the Inquiry, the American expert-group investigating the 
frontier of Europe, were never united when trying to establish the best possible frontier for 
northern Italy. Unfortunately, at the beginning of the negotiations, Italian documents were 
the only source of information available on the South Tyrol, and they were correspondingly 
perforated by pro-Italian propaganda. Italy refused to permit a territorial inspection of the 
area so that the American experts could not make a judgment at the scene of action.28 
Regarding South Tyrol, strategic and ethnic arguments clashed, and the Inquiry never 
reached a united final decision.29 Furthermore, Colonel House, Wilson's representative in 
Europe, predetermined the decision to give the South Tyrol to Italy during the pre-
Armistice negotiations. 
At the beginning of the discussions about the future peace in Europe, Colonel 
House prepared a detailed commentary on the Fourteen Points in order to avoid ambiguous 
interpretation. According to Charles Seymour, head of the American Commission in Paris, 
the Commentary was largely the work of Walter Lippmann, Secretary of the Inquiry, and 
Franc Irving Cobb, an American Journalist. The report suggested the Brenner frontier for 
northern Italy citing strategic reasons. At the same time it recommended the principle of 
autonomy be applied to that area. House cabled this Commentary to Woodrow Wilson on 
October 29, 1918 and Wilson replied that the Commentary was "a satisfactory 
interpretation of the principles involved. "30 By accepting the Commentary, Wilson had 
28 Schober, Tiro/er Frage, 68. 
29 Karl Stuhlpfarrer, Sudtirol 1919, in ed. Isabella Ackerl and Rudolf Neck, Saint-Germain 1919 
{Milnchen: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1989), 67. 
30 Albrecht-Carrie, Italy, 63. 
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agreed "that Italy should have her claim in the Trentino, but that the northern part, inhabited 
by Germans, should be completely autonomous, and that the population should not be 
liable to military service in the Italian army. Italy could thus occupy the uninhabited Alpine 
peaks for military purposes, but would not govern the cultural life of the alien population to 
the south of the frontier."31 On October 31, 1918 Colonel House in a meeting with the 
three Allied Prime Ministers presented the Commentary and thus officially accepted the 
boundary-lines as determined by the Treaty of London as the demarcation-lines between 
Austria-Hungary and Italy, although House stressed that the US would have preferred to 
obtain guarantees for the boundaries without reference to the Treaty. 32 According to 
historian Albrecht-Carrie, Wilson did not question the staff of the Inquiry before returning 
a positive answer to Colonel House. The Brenner issue had practically been settled in 
advance of the Inquiry's recommendation, because the Commentary was not only used 
apart from the pre-Armistice discussion, but according to Edward Mandell House, "these 
interpretations were on the table day after day when we sat in conference in Paris while the 
Armistice was in the making. 11 33 
House realized that the step to recognize the Treaty of London partially had been a 
mistake as early as November 1918 when he saw the first severe problems on the Adriatic 
arise. The Treaty of London had also promised Italy territories on the Yugoslavian coast 
and Italy now began to take them over. Italy had by now occupied the Dalmatian coast and 
thus strained relations between Italy and Yugoslavia were putting more and more pressure 
on the peace-negotiators of Europe.34 The American staff in Paris was now confronted 
with solving the problem whether the United States, with the pre-Armistice negotiations, 
had accepted the terms of the Treaty of London of 1915. They decided that this was not the 
case. Albrecht-Carrie states that David Hunter Miller, advisor of the American 
31 Albrecht-Carrie, ltalv, 63. 
32 Inga Floto, Colonel House in Paris. A Study of American Policy at the Paris Peace Conference 
1919 (Universitetsforlaget I Aarhus, 1973), 45. 
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Commission in Paris, on December 13, 1918 had correctly interpreted the American 
attitude in this regard when he ascertained 
that the Note of the Allies quoted in the communication of the President of 5 
November, 1918 to the German Government ... must be considered to have 
modified the Pact of London in any respect in which the same is 
inconsistent with the Fourteen Points of the President; for the Note of the 
Allies is signed on behalf of the British, French, and Italian Governments, 
the parties to the Pact of London. 35 
Indeed, on November 5, 1918 Italy together with the other Allied Powers, had agreed to 
"make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the 
President's address to Congress in January [8], 1918, and the principles of settlement 
enunciated in his subsequent addresses. "36 Therefore Miller's explanation of December 
13, 1918 was a valid interpretation. Barely a month later, on January 11, 1919 David 
Hunter Miller was again asked about his opinion on the validity of the Treaty of London, 
and in a letter to Colonel House he replied in the same way as he had done before in 
December 1918. Again Miller expressed the opinion that the "provisions of the Pact of 
London of April 26, 1915 ... were ... abrogated and are no longer in force." This time 
Miller made one slight reservation: peace should be reache.d on the basis of Wilson's 
Fourteen Points "and the Principles enunciated in his subsequent addresses, subject only to 
certain qualifications mentioned in said correspondence."31 
Following the pre-Armistice negotiations several American experts, engaged in 
studying the northern frontier of Italy, reported their view to Washington. Strategic, 
economic, linguistic, and climatic considerations competed with the recommendations 
issued by the American experts. In November 1918 Nelson Gay, Italy-expert in the 
Inquiry submitted a memorandum to the State Department. Gay was extremely ltalophile 
and was furthermore strongly influenced by the American Ambassador to Italy, Nelson 
35 Albrecht-Carrie, Italy, 80. 
36 American Note of November 5, 1918, in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference (Washington DC.: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1942), 1 :360. 
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Page. Gay's report recommended the Brenner-frontier, not only for strategic reasons, but 
also because the Brenner-line was the natural and morally just border as well as the mental 
and geographic division of two different cultures and hence ignored the existence of a 
strong German-speaking minority south of the Brenner.38 
Unfortunately, the documents do not reveal whether the American President 
Woodrow Wilson, who in the end would have the final pay in determining what decision 
would be made, was influenced by Gay's memorandum, or if he even read it. At this time 
Wilson was surrounded by a strong pro-Italian party. During his journey on the "George 
Washington" from the US to Europe at the beginning of December, Woodrow Wilson was 
accompanied by the staff of the Inquiry and by the French and the Italian ambassador, Jean 
Jules Jusserand and Count Macchi di Cellere. The ocean crossing was a good opportunity 
for the Italian ambassador to have informal exchanges on the Italian situation. Di Cellere 
apparently took great advantage of that, and on several occasions he conferred with the 
head of the Inquiry, Sidney E. Mezes, whom he apparently convinced of the validity of the 
Italian claims both on the northern frontier and in the Adriatic. 39 Later the head of the 
Inquiry's opinion on the question of the South Tyrol appeared like a copy of Italian 
propaganda. For example, on March 16, 1919 Mezes wrote: 
The treaty of London line in the Trentino gives Italy a security of frontier 
advantageous in the interests of disarmament, and probably necessary and 
expedient if German Austria should later on, as she well may, be united 
with Germany. The German-speaking Tyro Iese in the region concerned 
seem not to have much attachment to German Austria, and still less to 
Germany. Autonomy would no doubt satisfy them and meet their just 
needs.40 
Upon his arrival in Paris Woodrow Wilson engaged himself in solving the question 
of the Italian frontier which he considered to be the easiest to negotiate and which he hoped 
would emerge as a test case for the other treaties.4 1 Apparently Wilson, as early as 
38 Schober, Tiro/er Frage, 63-64. 
39 Albrecht-Carrie, Italy, 78-79. 
40 Albrecht-Carrie, Italy, 120. 
41 Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919 (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1965), 164. 




December 12, 1918,42 asked for clarification of the situation of the northern frontier in Italy 
and received a memorandum on the South Tyrol on December 13, 1918 drawn by 
Professor William E. Lunt, member of the Inquiry.43 Lunt's document reflects an 
intensive study of the situation in the South Tyrol. For cultural and economic reasons, he 
suggested annexing part of the Ladin territories to Italy. In accordance with that, he finally 
proposed the language-border for northern Italy. Yet, if political or strategic criteria had to 
prevail over the ethnic principle, Lunt suggested the Brenner-line as the most adequate 
concession. 44 
In addition to Lunt's proposal, General Jan Christiaan Smuts from South Africa on 
December 16, 1918 submitted his plan for the League of Nations. Contemporaries, such 
as David Hunter Miller,45 and historians, such as Arthur S. Link, the editor of the Wilson 
Papers, viewed this document as influencing deeply the President in many of his decisions. 
In the case of the South Tyrol, however, Wilson did not apply Smuts' principle. Smuts' 
plan for the League of Nations suggested that no victorious State would receive any 
territorial compensation at all and that "in the future government of these territories [which 
victorious States now claimed] and peoples the rule of self-determination, or the consent of 
the governed to their form of government, shall be fairly and reasonably applied." 
Consequently Italy would remain without reward for her entry into World War I.46 Arthur 
S. Link maintains that President Wilson received this document as early as December 17, 
1918 and evidently began to read it on his trip to Italy on January 1, 1919.47 Pomerance 
argues that in the early discussions about the League of Nations an article about the self-
determination of peoples was included. In the final draft, however, this article was 
42 Seymour to his Family, Dec. 12, 1918, in ed. Arthur S. Link, The Papers of Woodrow 
Wilson. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 53:377. 
43 Allyn Abbott Young to Woodrow Wilson, Dec. 13,1918, in Wilson Papers, 53:381. 
44 Schober, Tiro/er Frage, 64. 
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dropped because the principle created too many insoluble problems in international 
affairs.48 
Before his trip to Italy, which was due at the beginning of January, Wilson met 
with representatives of the Italian government in Paris. Historians have argued that this 
was the decisive meeting for Wilson's decision to give the South Tyrol to Italy. Edward 
Mandell House reported that Wilson met with Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, the Italian 
Premier, and Baron Sidney Sonnino, Foreign Secretary, on December 21, 1918 where he 
tried to convince the Italians to take a less firm stand on the Treaty of London. How far 
Wilson committed himself during these discussions is still not known. Yet, an article in the 
Revue des Deux Mondes of January 15, 1919 by an anonymous writer, who according to 
historian Albrecht-Carrie "seems to have been well informed," claimed that by now Wilson 
had already made a decision in this regard. The article explains that when Orlando and 
Sonnino met Wilson in Paris the President argued that the Brenner frontier was justified for 
strategic reasons, but not the Italian demands on the eastern frontier.49 
Wilson's stay in Italy provided him with the opportunity to talk to Leonida Bissolati 
who had resigned as minister only few days earlier. Bissolati, the leader of the opposition 
to Orlando's government was against the Italian territorial claims. Wilson met Bissolati in 
the afternoon of January 4, 1919 and listened to the minister's suggestions for the Italian 
frontier. Bissolati's standpoint was strongly in line with the Wilsonian program and denied 
Italy any right to the Dalmatian coast and to the South TyroI.50 Shortly after his meeting 
with Wilson, Bissolati even put his ideas in writing. In an article in the Morning Post on 
January 11, 1919, Bissolati demanded Italian renunciation of the Dalmatian coast and the 
South Tyrol because both claims were not in accordance with Wilson's principle of self-
48 Pomerance, Self-Determination, 7. 
49 Albrecht-Carrie, Italy, 80-81. 
50 Digest of the President's Conference with On. Bissolati, Jan. 4, 1919, in Wilson Papers, 
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determination. For the northern frontier he proposed a line south of Bozen which would 
integrate into Italy only a very small minority of German-speaking people.51 
So far, the President had negotiated without advice from the Inquiry, which for a 
long time could not reach a united position on the northern frontier of Italy. The 
memorandum the Inquiry finally issued on January 21, 1919 consisted of a compromise.52 
The American experts proposed that the northern frontier of Italy should be "midway 
between the linguistic line and the line of the treaty of London, 1915." The explanation for 
this line was that Italy had a "just claim [for that part of the Tyrol] on linguistic, cultural or 
historical grounds." This line, which divided the South Tyrol, would prevent any future 
Italian irredentist claim and would also "ameliorate the intentionally bad frontier imposed 
upon Italy by Austria." It would furthermore coincide with geographical and natural 
demarcations which in any case divided two dissimilar climatic areas.53 
Unfortunately none of the document-collections consulted gave further evidence on 
how far President Wilson at this point had already committed himself on the question of the 
South Tyrol. While, by the beginning of January, he was convinced that the Trentino and 
Trieste should be made part of the Italian state,54 historians still don't know what Wilson's 
definition of the Trentino was and whether he included the South Tyrol in it or not. In any 
case, neither the memoranda mentioned earlier, nor Wilson's meeting with the Italian 
minister Leonida Bissolati, nor the report of the Inquiry on the northern frontier of January 
21, 1919 seemed to have any influence on the decision to cede the South Tyrol to Italy. 
Charles Seymour argued that Wilson had agreed to the Brenner-line already in January 
1919. 55 Despite missing evidence and missing statements from Woodrow Wilson in 
person, and considering how captivated Wilson was with preventing Italy from getting any 
51 Schober, Tiro/er Frage, 75-76. 
52 Stuhlpfarrer, Siidtirol, 67. 
53 American Territorial Report, January 21, 1919, in Albrecht-Carrie, 367-68. 
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territory on the Yugoslavian border, it is likely that Seymour's claim corresponds to reality. 
Indeed, no statement of Wilson at this time referred to the South Tyrol. Whenever the 
question of the Italian borders arose, Woodrow Wilson immediately concentrated on the 
problem of the border with Yugoslavia. As Charles Seymour formulated it, "the problem 
received insufficient consideration at the time. "56 
Apparently Wilson had already made the decision to yield the South Tyrol to Italy in 
January, 1919. On January 13, 1919 President Wilson wrote a letter to Orlando stating his 
view on the frontiers of Italy. The letter was never sent but it still gives an insight into 
Wilson's ideas. In regard to the northern border Wilson stated: "I assume, in all these 
proposals, that the readjusted boundaries of Italy on the north and northeast will run 
substantially as indicated by the solid black line on the accompanying map ( ... the line 
proposed ... in the 'Pact of London'). "57 Later, during a meeting with Orlando on January 
30, 1919 Orlando opened the conversation with a reference to unofficial American 
proposals for an Italian mandate for Trentino and Trieste and added that he refused to 
accept such an offer. At this point Wilson replied "the Trentino and Trieste had, as far as 
he was concerned, already been ceded to Italy." Charles Seymour58 and historian 
Albrecht-Carrie argue that the context of the argument clearly implies that Wilson was 
talking about the whole Trentino-South TyroI.59 
In any case, at some point Wilson must indeed have promised the Brenner-line to 
Orlando. Much later, on May 28, 1928, Colonel House wrote that Arthur Frazier, 
secretary of the American peace-delegation, had told him that Wilson during the Paris Peace 
Conference had promised the Brenner to Orlando: "I cannot," Wilson supposedly said, 
"consent to Fiume, but you can count upon me for the Brenner line." Unfortunately, 
56 Seymour, "Woodrow Wilson," 567. 
57 Wilson to Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, January 13, 1919, in Wilson Papers, 54:51. 
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House does not comment on the date when the conversation took place. 60 The events that 
follow indicate that Wilson by the early months of 1919 had indeed already made a decision 
and had also made a commitment. On April 14, 1919, despite a series of memoranda by 
Professor Archibald Cary Coolidge which strongly advised against the Italian claims in the 
South Tyrol, Woodrow Wilson finally put his ideas on paper. That day he handed a 
Memorandum Concerning the Question of Italian Claims on the Adriatic to Orlando and 
encouraged him to publish it. Orlando held the document back until April 29, 1919, when 
he presented the paper in the Italian Parliament. The memorandum stated the President's 
argument as follows: 
Personally, I am quite willing that Italy should be accorded along the whole 
length of her Northern frontier and wherever she comes into contact with 
Austrian territory all that was accorded her in the so-called Pact of London, 
but I am of the clear opinion that the pact of London can no longer apply to 
the settlement of her Eastern boundaries.61 
Wilson was not willing to dispute this point. Even as the Italian delegation at the 
end of April withdrew from Paris and thus threatened to disrupt the Peace Conference, the 
President was not willing to reconsider the cession of the South Tyrol to Italy. On May 2, 
1919, Wilson argued that the retainment of the South Tyrol by Austria was "a question to 
be re-examined ifltaly parts company with us."62 On the contrary, as Italy came back to 
the conference-table in May, Wilson also expressed his wish, that it should not only get the 
South Tyrol, but that the territories of the Sexten Valley and Tarvis should be added. Italy 
had demanded these territories on February 7, 1919 arguing that the railways in that region 
were essential to Italy. 63 On May 13, 1919 President Wilson proposed "to give Italy the 
valley of Sexten, which, it is true, contains three or four thousand Germans, but whose 
60 Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, The Ending of the War (Boston and 
New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928), 435. 
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possession by Italy would close off one of the last open passages for invasion across the 
Alps .... The proposed solution would give one of the tunnels, with the town of Tarvis, to 
the Italians .... Thus the branches of the railroad would be fairly equitably divided."64 
Why Wilson so willingly consented to give up the principle of nationality and self-
determination in regard to the South Tyrol is not easy to understand. For reasons of self-
determination Wilson refused to give Italy the Slavic territory on the eastern frontier. For 
the same reasons he rejected the idea of imposing on Austria the promise not to unite with 
Germany. In the case of South Tyrol, Wilson, however, refused to use the principle of 
self-determination as a basis for negotiation. Apparently, Wilson was aware that self-
determination was an ideal that could not uncompromisingly be used for the many 
nationalities that existed in Europe. In a speech given at the sixty-sixth Congress in 1919 
Wilson argued: 
When I gave utterance to those words ('that all nations had a right to self-
determination'), I said them without the knowledge that nationalities 
existed, which are coming to us day after day .... You do not know and 
cannot appreciate the anxieties that I have experienced as the result of many 
millions of people having their hopes raised by what I have said. 65 
Besides, in the case of Italy the conflict between the the concept of self-
determination of peoples and the sanctity of treaties existed. Although Wilson again and 
again refused to recognize the Treaty of London, he also admitted that some modifications 
to the principle of self-determination were necessary for strategic reasons, or in the case of 
Italy because of "an earnest desire to meet Italian demands. "66 Indeed, American 
justifications for the northern Italian frontier almost exclusively stressed the necessity to 
guarantee Italy's safety. In a telegram of November 12, 1919 Robert Lansing, American 
secretary for foreign affairs wrote: "Italy claimed a frontier on the Brenner Pass, and the 
demand was granted in order to assure to Italy the greatest possible protection on her 
64 Mantoux's Notes of a Meeting of the Council of Four, May 13, 1919, in Wilson Papers, 
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northern front, although it involved annexing to Italy a considerable region populated by 
alien inhabitants. "67 Colonel House was also of the opinion that Italy's strategic arguments 
were valuable. On January 31, 1920 House argued that Italy needed a strong frontier to the 
north.68 
In the end, the strategic reasoning in the case of South Tyrol became more than the 
abandonment of self-determination in one particular, limited case. Wilson's acceptance of 
the northern Italian frontier as stated in the Treaty of London became a precedent for future 
negotiations for the peace settlement. On May 4, 1919, during a meeting of the Council ~f 
Four, Lloyd George raised the question of the priority of the strategic frontier over ethnic 
considerations. Lloyd George maintained that Italy had a real case in claiming the Adriatic 
frontier for strategic reasons. He insisted that President Woodrow Wilson had agreed that 
"the ethnic principle was not the only one that could be adopted by admitting that Italy 
should have great parts of the Tyrol." Lloyd George wanted to apply the same principle to 
the Adriatic coast, if Italy's east coast was seriously menaced.69 Indeed, the Text of the 
Territorial and Political Clauses of the Peace Treaty with Austria in connection with the 
South Tyrol also insists that Austria for a long time had been a menace to the Italian people, 
and by giving the South Tyrol to Italy this threat would no longer exist. 70 In the case of 
the South Tyrol, Woodrow Wilson at a very early stage put ethnic and national 
considerations and the principle of self-determination aside and let strategic reasoning and a 
plea for national security prevail. Historians have claimed that this was one of Wilson's 
greatest mistakes, because it signaled that self-determination was not an irrevocable 
necessity, it was not the sine qua non of the future peace in Europe. Harold Nicolson 
maintained that the decision in the South Tyrol convinced the participants of the Peace 
67 Temperley, History, 284. 
68 Seymour, House, 197. 
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Conference that obstinate negotiation could lead to success, because "if he [Wilson] could 
take the Brenner, he could take anything."71 
For President Woodrow Wilson, in this case ethnic considerations were never a 
concern. In fact, the other parties involved in the peace negotiations, also showed 
discontent with how the principles, that should have guided the whole conference, were 
laid aside. Arthur James Balfour, the British secretary for foreign affairs in July 28, 1919, 
disillusioned by the conference, commented: "They say, and say truly, that if language, 
race, and the wishes of the neutral powers had in this case governed the decision of the 
Conference southern Tyrol would never have been Italian. Self determination, however, 
and nationality were outweighed by strategic considerations and Italy obtained what she 
desired, the frontier of the Alps. "72 
Historian Karl Stuhlpfarrer argued that it was not strategic reasoning that motivated 
the American President. On the contrary, Wilson rejected both the Treaty of London and 
the strategic arguments. Stuhlpfarrer argues that Wilson completely accepted the argument 
of the natural unity of the area. 73 As early as January 13, 1919 Woodrow Wilson argued 
against the arguments of the Italians that the Brenner-line was essential to Italy's security: 
"The boundaries proposed in that agreement [Pact of London] were laid down as a frontier 
against the Austro-Hungarian Empire and that Empire no longer exists. It has been broken 
up into a number of States no one of which will be strong enough seriously to menace 
Italy."74 Indeed, Woodrow Wilson at times became rather annoyed by the Italians' 
referring to treaties concluded prior to the publication of the principles that should guide the 
world toward peace. On April 18, 1919 Wilson for example declared: "Italy is the only one 
insisting upon claims inconsistent with the principles explicitly laid down at the basis of the 
peace, and is pressing for settlements more consistent with the processes of the Congress 
71 Nicolson, Peacemaking, 170. 
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of Vienna than with the present temper of the world. "75 The President was furthermore 
convinced that the concession of the South Tyrol did not imply that the peace negotiators 
had accepted the Treaty of London. On February 24, 1920 President Wilson declared that 
the agreements reached on northern Italy did depart from the Treaty of London since the 
actual line proposed by the peace negotiators went beyond the line drawn in the Treaty of 
London and included Tarvis and the Sexten Valley.76 Wilson did accept the argument of 
the natural unity of the northern Italian area claimed by the Italian Government. The notes 
of Maurice Hankey, secretary of the Council of Four, on April 19, 1919 reveal that 
Within certain limits he [Wilson] agreed that natural boundaries such as 
existed in the cases of Spain or Scandinavia . . . must be taken into 
consideration. The whole course of life in these regions was determined by 
such natural boundaries. The slope of the mountains not only threw the 
rivers in a certain direction but tended to throw the life of the people in the 
same direction. These, however, were not strategic nor economic 
arguments. On these grounds he felt no difficulty in assenting to that part of 
the Italian claims included in M. Orlando's first point [northern frontier of 
Italy, inferring the theory of the natural water-shed]. 77 
Ironically, the areas of Tarvis and the Sexten Valley were inconsistent with the argument of 
natural unity since these territories lay east of the natural frontier Wilson had addressed. 
Finally, Wilson himself recognized that the decision to cede the South Tyrol to Italy 
was a mistake. The concession of the South Tyrol to Italy had set a precedent for the 
violation of the principle of self-determination. Not only the Italian Government, but also 
other nations took advantage of this and in the end, the Italian Government's obstinacy, 
when it tried to get the same commitments for Yugoslavia, threatened to dissolve the Peace 
Conference. Wilson admitted that he had violated ethnographic arguments in the case of 
the South Tyrol. Thomas William Lamont, financial advisor of the American delegation, 
on July 5, 1919 noted in his diary: "Woodrow Wilson said frankly I made a mistake there. 
I wasn't familiar with the map. They told me it was one of the Treaty of London that was 
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ok. I accepted & O.K.'d without study & when I found out my mistake the Italian plot 
was already so thick that I felt I could not back track. "78 
Historians and Wilson's contemporaries have used different arguments to explain 
Wilson's decision to give the South Tyrol to Italy. Harold Nicolson maintained that 
Wilson needed the Italian Government's support for the League of Nations, which more 
and more became the President's favorite toy.79 Richard Schober implied that the Fourteen 
Points and self-determination could not have been realized in any case. First of all, they 
encountered considerable resistance from the Allies themselves. Clemenceau eventually 
even voted for the old European balance of power as the basis for peace. Lloyd George 
won the elections with anti-German slogans. In the United States the principles were 
subject to various pressure groups, especially to the Republican party, which had recently 
regained a majority in both Houses of Congress and now advocated punitive measures for 
Germany. 80 In addition, time pressure and the Allies forging of the peace diminished the 
chances that Wilson's ideas would be realized. The Allied nations wanted to disarm as 
soon as possible and therefore were pushing for a fast conclusion of the treaties. 
Furthermore, in Schober's words, nobody wanted a second Congress of Vienna. 
Therefore, instead of long negotiations, the peacemakers had to make compromises, and 
the South Tyrol was one of them. 81 Charles Seymour and Edward Mandell House 
maintained that Wilson, by conceding the South Tyrol, hoped that the Italian Government 
would yield on the Adriatic question. 82 Mario Toscano is of the same opinion and he adds 
that the delay of the final decision in the South Tyrol question after Woodrow Wilson's 
commitments of April 19, 1919 was merely due to the negotiators' need to exert pressure 
78 From the Diary of Thomas William Lamont, July 5, 1919, in Wilson Papers, 59:387-88. 
79 Nicolson, Peacemaking, 168. 
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on Italy. 83 Wal worth and Schober underlined that well calculated tactics used by the Italian 
delegates succeeded in winning President Wilson's sympathy more than other nations 
did. 84 In the end, the peace settlements were indeed designed to ensure nationalism and 
democracy, and all peoples had the right to self-determination. Yet, exempt from this right 
were the defeated Germans and especially the peoples of the former Habsburg 
Monarchy. 85 
Historians have also pointed out that Wilson's disregard for the principle of self-
determination in the case of South Tyrol and his plea of ignorance revealed a lack of 
professional diplomacy in the management of the many controversial aspects of 
peacemaking. 86 Historian William L. Langer argues that despite the sincerity of his 
purposes, Wilson had a very limitted knowledge about the European nations and their 
problems. When Wilson established the principle of self-determination he had no notion of 
the difficulties the realization of it would involve. 87 Yet, coming back to Wilson's first 
interpretation of self-determination, the President's handling of the complicated 
circumstances in Europe appear in a different light. As mentioned earlier, Wilson's 
interpretation of self-determination did not naturally imply ethnographic units as a basis for 
self-determination. Wilson faced the extent of ethnic conflict on the one side and ethnic 
empathy on the other only when he arrived in Paris in autumn 1918. Also House's 
proposal of October 29, 1918 which, for the first time, outlined the concept of autonomy 
for the German speaking inhabitants of the South Tyrol, reflects that ethnic considerations 
were not yet a major issue in the American mind and that in their eyes autonomy would 
suffice in solving such conflicts.88 
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Taking into consideration the countless theoretical and practical difficulties that 
confronted Wilson in Paris it is not surprising that the principle of self-determination was 
not universally implemented. And it had to be expected that the peacemakers would later 
becharged with the betrayal of this concept. Critics of Wilson often ignore these factors 
and disregard the influence Wilson's counterparts and different interest-groups in the US 
had at the conference-table. Historians still continue to idealize the idea of self-
determination just as Wilson had done prior to his stay in Europe.89 Wilson's mistaken 
belief that the League of Nations would make frontiers unnecessary reflects his idealism. 
According to that belief, he would neglect the question of ethnic incongruity with frontiers 
because he believed that the League of Nations could solve all these problems. Only later 
in December 1918, according to historian Richard Schober, did Wilson realize that this was 
not possible. Consequently the President gradually revised his policy.90 
Wilson's illusion about both the principle of self-determination and about the impact 
of ethnic allegiency in Europe lead to the suspicion that the President had indeed promised 
the South Tyrol to Italy at a very early stage in the discussions, probably as early as 
December 1918 when he was not yet aware of the profundity of ethnic concerns. The 
discussions about the South Tyrol that followed in 1919 suggest that Wilson merely 
searchedto rationalize that decision. Strategic reasoning and the explanation of the "natural 
unity" of the area seem nothing but an explanation post factum. Self-determination as 
interpreted prior to the Peace Conference had raised the hopes of many peoples but it 
simply did not conform to European realities. Woodrow Wilson's cession of the Austro-
German South Tyrol to Italy did not symbolize the disregard of the concept of Wilson's 
initial view of self-determination before it was even allowed to prove its validity. It did, 
however, show that Wilson was willing to violate the principles he himself had laid down 
for the European peace conference since the case of the South Tyrol clearly was a violation 
89 Pomerance, Self-Determination, 5. 
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of point nine of the Fourteen points. Wilson's yielding in the South Tyrol signaled that 
self-determination was not an indisputable position and consequently convinced the 
participants of the Peace Conference that obstinate insistence would eventually lead to 
success. 
Ironically, in other cases, Woodrow Wilson fully interpreted self-determination as a 
principle designed for the protection of ethnic minorities. In April 1919 Belgium raised a 
claim for a small German territory to strengthen its frontiers. The area would bring about 
four thousand Germans to live under Belgian rule. In this case Woodrow Wilson 
vehemently defended his principle of self-determination and he spoke out boldly: "Ought 
we not to have as many scruples," he insisted, "whether it is a question of 4,000 Germans, 
or of four million?" The President's influence in this case assured the small German 
minority, which was integrated into Belgium, of an outstanding autonomy.91 In the case 
of the South Tyrol, at that time, Wilson had already committed himself, and any reasoning 
in the line of self-determination was in vain. Indeed, as mentioned before, in May he even 
advised to add the territory of Tarvis and the Sexten valley which would bring merely 
another four thousand German-speaking Tyroleans into Italy. But the South Tyrol was not 
the only instance in which self-determination was not applied. Minorities in Poland, 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia shared the same fate. 
91 Walworth, Peacemakers, 274. 
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Map ill: Lines proposed at the north-eastern frontier ofltaly in 1915 and 1919 
in Rene Albrecht-Carrie, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1966), 93. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE SOUTH TYROL BETWEEN ITALIAN FASCISM AND 
GERMAN NATIONAL SOCIALISM 
Historian Arthur Walworth argues that after the peace treaty with Austria, American 
diplomats worked diligently to repair the damage that Wilson had done by permitting the 
incorporation of the South Tyrol into Italy and his stubborn opposition in the Fiume 
question. Then Fascism hit the Italian peninsula and a flood of articles not only made 
American public opinion aware of the problem in South Tyrol but also increasingly led to 
criticism of fascist Italy.92 Walworth continues that, in the meantime, "in the south Tyrol 
hundreds of thousands of German-Austrians were vowing to give all the trouble they could 
to the Italian Government that annexed them ... 93 This was only partially true. During the 
first years of South Tyrolean integration into Italy, both Italian authorities and South 
Tyrolean political representatives tried to find an appropriate solution for the future 
settlement of the German-speaking minority at the northern frontier of Italy. Yet, after 
Benito Mussolini and his fascist party took over in 1922, the South Tyroleans faced a 
different treatment by the Italian authorities. Fascism threatened not only to suppress the 
language of the German-speaking minority in the north, but also began to uproot the 
cultural identity of that area. Consequently, the South Tyroleans began to look north for 
relief through a culturally close and increasingly powerful Nazi Germany and its leader, 
Adolf Hitler. Yet, their hopes would remain unfulfilled. Political needs, once again, 
overpowered ethnic and, in the case of Nazi-Germany, racist considerations. Despite 
92 Walworth, Peacemakers, 345. 
93 Walworth, Peacemakers, 558. 
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Hitler's racist ideology, the South Tyrol remained with Italy. But the two fascist leaders, 
Mussolini and Hitler, found another solution to the problem. They decided to move the 
German-speaking South Tyroleans north of the Brenner and resettle them in German 
territory. 
With the signing of the Austrian peace treaty in 1919, Italy officially integrated the 
South Tyrol. Italian administration slowly replaced the old Austrian organization. For 
both the Italians and the South Tyroleans the initial period was confusing. The Italian 
Government had no clear directions on how to confront this new minority in the north. 
The South Tyroleans for a long time could not accept the fact that they were part of Italy 
and hoped that North Tyroleans and Austrian political intervention would eventually allow 
their return to Austria. Both sides initiated half-hearted discussions about autonomy for the 
South Tyrol. In December 1919 a South Tyrolean delegation, who in the meantime had 
politically organized themselves in the party "Deutscher Verein, .. 94 presented a draft for 
South Tyrolean autonomy, which was guided by pre-war Austro-Hungarian autonomy 
settlements, to the government in Rome. In August 1920 both Italian and German-
speaking Socialists introduced another draft for autonomy. Yet, the steps taken towards a 
realization of the projects were not very serious. 95 For the Italian Government, autonomy 
was not a pressing factor and the South Tyroleans themselves were reluctant to collaborate 
with a Government that they considered inferior.96 
Nevertheless Italy at this point decided to reconcile with the South Tyroleans. A 
year earlier, in 1919 during the peace negotiations in Paris under Prime Minister Vittorio 
Emanuele Orlando, the Italian Government had tried to prevent the interference of the 
nationalist arguments of Ettore Tolomei, the anti-minority ideologist and later ideological 
leader of Italian Fascism, in order to show the Allies that there was no threat of a 
94 "German Organization." 
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mistreatment of the German-speaking South Tyroleans in the Italian nation.97 According to 
the peace treaties of Paris Italy had not made any promises that guaranteed a South 
Tyrolean autonomy. The future relation between Italy and the minority was actually 
mentioned only in point four in a note that was added to the Austrian peace terms. In that 
note the Allies and Austria recognized that "the Italian Government intended to pursue a 
liberal policy toward its new subjects of German nationality with regard to their language, 
culture, and economic interest. "98 Furthermore, South Tyroleans, Austrian, and German 
politicians later argued that Italy in the early years of Italian reign over the South Tyrol, had 
made oral promises of granting a special autonomy to the minority. Indeed, in a 
memorandum to Italy's Prime Minister Francesco Saverio Nitti, the Governor of South 
Tyrol, Luigi Credaro, on November 11, 1919, outlined the policy that liberal Italy would 
follow toward the German-speaking minority until the early 1920's. Credaro mentioned 
that Italy, according to the peace-treaties of Paris, was not obliged to grant the South Tyrol 
a special autonomy. Yet, "the right of nature, moral obligation, national dignity and even 
the political interest recommended ... to examine all desires of the South Tyroleans in a 
benevolent manner." On December 1, 1919, King Vittorio Emanuele ill also announced 
that Italy's tradition of "freedom" had to determine the path through which the problems the 
newly integrated territories created could be solved and that this policy had to be a policy 
which had "the greatest respect of local autonomies and traditions ... 99 
The attitude of the Italian Government came to an abrupt end when Benito 
Mussolini and his fascist blackshirts overthrew the Italian socialist government in their 
"March on Rome" on October 28, 1922. Actually, the fascists had practiced their "March 
on Rome" in the South Tyrol only three weeks earlier. Already before Mussolini's 
97 Klaus WeiB, Das Siidtirol-Problem in der Ersten Republik. Dargestellt an 6sterreichs Innen-
und AujJenpolitik im Jahre 1928 (Wien: Veriag ftir Geschichte und Politik and Miinchen: Oldenbourg, 
1989), 16. 
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takeover, on October 4, 1919, seven hundred blackshirts had attacked Bozen, the capital of 
the South Tyrol. They occupied the school and the townhall, dissolved the municipal 
council and forced the mayor of the town out of his office. After that, they moved on to 
Trent, the capital of the neighboring province Trentino and demanded Governor Credaro to 
resign. Consequently, on October 5, the fascists' uproar managed to dissolve all offices 
that had been established during the last years for the coordination of minority problems in 
Italy. From that day on, for the Italian Government minorities ceased to exit.IOO 
In Italian fascist ideology, minorities had no room. Ettore Tolomei, the ideological 
leader of the fascist party, already prior to World War I, had tried to show that the southern 
part of the Tyrol was of Italian origin. Tolomei's recommendations had also contributed 
largely to Italy's demand for the Brenner frontier both in 1915 and during the peace 
conferences in 1919. During the early days, fascist leaders and Mussolini himself were 
still interested in a truce with the South Tyroleans. Twice, in April 1923, and in October 
1924, when the fascists needed the South Tyroleans' support in the local elections they 
offered a compromise. They suggested that the South Tyroleans' political leaders declared 
their loyalty to the Italian Government and in return fascist Italy would guarantee the 
linguistic and economic interest of the area. In both instances a compromise failed due to 
the intervention of several fascist party leaders. Then, on January 3, 1925, Mussolini's 
final coup d'etat and the subsequent establishment of the fascist dictatorship erased all 
needs for cooperation with the German-speaking minority in the north of Italy. IOI From 
now on the fascist government strictly followed Ettore Tolomei's recomendations for the 
treatment of the South Tyroleans. 
According to Ettore Tolomei, the German-speaking minority in the South Tyrol had 
to be "re-Italianized." Therefore already on July 15, 1923, he presented a program 
consisting of thirty-two points through which this aim was supposed to be achieved. The 
100 Benedikt, Option, 45. 
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first and major aim was to Italianize the public language of the area, to introduce Italian as 
the official language, to Italianize all public inscriptions, town names, street names, and 
eventually family names and inscriptions on tombstones. In addition the program forbade 
the use of all words which psychologically and ideologically would lead to an anti-Italian 
attitude, such as "Tyrol," and "South Tyrol." The name "South Tyrol" was changed into 
"Alto Adige." 102 German-speaking officials were replaced by Italians, the traditional 
Austrian mayor was replaced by the Italian "podesta." South Tyrolean schools were 
gradually dissolved and replaced by Italian schools, South Tyrolean teachers dismissed and 
Italian teachers imported from southern Italian regions. South Tyrolean organizations and 
associations were mostly forbidden or replaced by Italian organizations. Only the marching 
bands and the Catholic singing groups could continue with their activities as long as they 
did not play or sing songs prohibited by the regime. Further, the Italian Government 
supported and pushed Italian immigration and assisted in the economic penetration of the 
region. Gradually Italian censorship would also control the South Tyrolean press. With 
the establishment of Mussolini's dictatorship in 1925, the fascists persecuted political 
enemies more fiercely than before, and finally in 1926 prohibited all South Tyrolean 
parties.103 
Following a "sugar bread and whip" policy, the fascists also provided "relief 
organizations," which would aid in further penetrating the German speaking communities. 
They offered free schoolbooks, meals and holidays by the sea for children who joined their 
youth organizations "Balilla" and "Piccole Italiane." They provided jobs for those adults 
who joined the workers association "Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro" and established trade 
connections for the companies who collaborated with the fascist economic organizations. 
By the end of the 1920's fascist organizations were present in almost every South Tyrolean 
102 The "Adige" is the Italian name for the largest river in the South Tyrol; "Alto" indicates the 
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village. By then fascist influence had fulfilled most of the thirty-two decrees for the South 
Tyrol. Through laws, decrees, and ordinances the region was supposed to have been 
Italianized and the Fascists rejoiced with the Italian people that the successful Italianization 
reflected the correctness of the Fascist ideology.104 
Yet, the fascist leaders in Rome were aware of the fact that Italianization was only 
theoretically accomplished. The South Tyroleans still spoke their German dialect, silently 
but persistently resisted Italian authorities, and were more anti-Italian than ever before. The 
decrees for the South Tyrol had not changed the Austro-Germanic culture and orientation of 
the South Tyroleans. Therefore, a second phase of Italianization was initiated. 
"Majoritarianism," the attempt by the Italian government to generate an Italian majority in 
the South Tyrol, was the new policy. To achieve that aim the fascists wanted to tum 
Bozen, the capital of the South Tyrol, into an Italian city. They built a new industrial 
complex at the town limits and a series of apartment buildings for Italian factory workers. 
And, an Italian recreational area, a new train station and a new market area were supposed 
to attract Italian immigration. In other cities the government financed the construction of 
hydroelectric power plants which would become the major energy source for the industry 
in other northern Italian regions. Furthermore, fascism aimed at the "conquista del suolo," 
the "conquest of the soil." Fascist administration exploited the economic crisis at the 
beginning of the l 930's and issued a government program which aimed at governmental 
purchase of land from South Tyrolean bankrupted farmers.105 
The South Tyroleans had little chance to resist the dictatorial measures. At first, the 
political representatives of the South Tyrol still tried to negotiate with Rome. Also, they 
relied on Austrian support and international protest. Finally, the representatives of the 
South Tyroleans presented their case to the League of Nations. But every initiative failed. 
Austria by this time depended on Italian economic help and Italy was part of different 
104 Benedikt, Option, 59. 
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international committees upon which Austria's redevelopment depended.106 During the 
interwar period the League of Nations was most of the time nothing but an instrument of 
the major powers to defend their policies.107 Although in September 1922 the League had 
suggested that all nations were supposed to engage in the protection of minorities, Italy was 
not bound to respect the rights of minorities and ignored the proclamations the League had 
issued in 1926 in favor of the South Tyrol. The Italian delegate actually advocated the right 
to absorb minorities and announced that Italy in the future would refuse to discuss the 
South Tyrol on an international level. Ultimately, with the dissolution of political parties in 
1926 in the South Tyrol, the region lost all possibilities of political influence. I 08 
Soon thereafter, the South Tyroleans withdrew from a public life into their private 
life and to passive resistance. I 09 Although open confrontation with the Italian regime was 
rare, the South Tyroleans managed to withstand most of the Italianization efforts. They 
could not prevent the ltalianization of the names of their villages and streets, but they 
prevented the Italianization of their children by speaking their German dialect at home and 
by teaching them written German in their illegal, secret schools, the proscribed "catacomb-
schools." I 10 In those organizations and associations that the Italian regime had not 
forbidden they found ways to bypass the official orders. The marching bands, for 
example, merely renamed the songs the fascists had prohibited. The traditional Austrian 
"Under the Double Eagle" l I I became the Italian "Eagle March" and the march "Vienna 
Always Remains Vienna" turned into a "Wine Always Remains Wine."1I2 
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Also during the second phase of ltalianization the South Tyroleans managed to 
prevent major incursions. True, fascist politics increased immigration of Italians to a 
previously unknown degree. But the immigrants mostly remained in the towns and in the 
zones deliberately constructed for them. Consequently the contact with the German-
speaking inhabitants was very limited. Also, due to secret financial help from German 
relief funds during the economic crisis, many South Tyroleans did not have to face 
bankruptcy. This was a vital matter for South Tyrolean unity since the Italian Government 
had begun to buy bankrupted farms and to sell or rent them very cheaply to Italian farmers 
from the South. The fascist policy to conquer the South Tyrolean agrarian sector also 
failed for other reasons. The farmers, mostly coming from southern Italian regions, did 
not know how to live of the mountainous land of the Alps. Furthermore, these farmers 
were surrounded by a hostile environment, which contributed to the failure of many of 
them who often, after a short-lived experiment in the Alps, returned to their hometowns in 
the South.113 
The domestic political situation did not allow the South Tyroleans to fight for relief. 
Therefore, their hopes concentrated on the international arena but especially on the German-
speaking countries in the north. At the outcome of World War I the Austria-Hungarian 
monarchy had shrunk to the powerless Austrian Republic. The Austrian Government had 
to struggle through major economic crises, and ironically depended on Italy's help. 
Therefore, Austria's interference with Italian policy toward the South Tyrol was practically 
non-existent. During the 1920's the South Tyroleans' irredentism towards Austria 
decreased noticeably. On the other hand, the South Tyrol looked increasingly up to a new 
partner in Europe: Germany, especially Nazi-Germany.114 Slowly the Austrian mother-
country was replaced by the German fatherland. 
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German ideology of Volk and Volkstum , the idea of a people as a racial 
community, allowed the South Tyroleans to identify themselves with something they had 
been deprived of through their integration into Italy. German ideology of Volkstum 
experienced an enormous boom after the Treaty of Versailles. The idea of Volkstum was 
not a new phenomenon in post-war Germany. Already in 1881 the "General School 
Association for the Preservation of the Germans in Foreign Countries" which in 1908 was 
renamed into the "Association for the Preservation of the Germans in Foreign Countries" 
indicated the direction in which the future Germany would go. In the alpine regions these 
tendencies found expression in the establishment of the Alpine Associations. Prior to 
1914, this ideology was restricted to a rather limited circle. The experience of World War I 
functioned as a multiplier of nationalistic feelings and the peace of Versailles, which forced 
millions of Germans to live under foreign reign, made the revision of Germany's frontier 
Germany's major goal. Therefore, already during the Weimar Republic the ideology of 
Volkstum experienced increasing circulation. Especially the Treaty of Locamo in 1925 
and Germany's entry into the League of Nations in 1926 helped turn the defensive 
Volkstum policy into an offensive one. After 1926 Germany intensified its revisionist 
policy in the east and southeast.115 
The idea of Volkstum found its most radical realization in Hitler's ideology. His 
unshakable insistence on the idea of race and space led South Tyroieans public opinion to 
the mistaken belief that they were also lost sheep of the German Third Reich. In the South 
Tyrol Hitler's racial ideology united all fronts, Catholic intellectuals with lay nationalists, 
and politically disinterested with militant activists. The Volk promised national and social 
integration, realities the South Tyroleans had lost during fascism.116 Already during the 
1920's in the South Tyrol a variety of resistance groups with ideological orientation toward 
Germany emerged. In 1928 these groups united in an illegal organization with the goal to 
115 Steurer, Siidtirol, 78-81. 
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fight for a united German Reich. In June 1933 the group was renamed to "Volkischer 
Kampfring Si.idtirols"l17 and thus received a name with a national socialist flavor. At the 
same time the "VKS" also adopted a national socialist program and began to build a region-
wide net of illegal organizations.118 
The VKS stood in opposition to the traditional catholic "Deutscher Vere in," which 
had continued to exist illegally after the prohibition of parties in 1926, but which still 
pursued South Tyrol's return to Austria. The new resistance group consisted mostly of 
young people, of the first post-war generation who had little recollection of the pre-war 
situation. For them Germany, and especially Nazi-Germany, was the example of 
unprecedented economic rise and a reflection of the modem age.119 Also, the German 
Reich with its projected removal of class barriers allowed the young generation to dream of 
an elimination of the social contrast. Therefore, the VKS was more than a protest against 
Italy. It was a protest of the young against the old and their established ideas and of the 
small farmer against the rich ones who had managed to find ways through which they 
could coexist with the fascist regime.120 Throughout the 1930's the fascist police did not 
succeed in uncovering the illegal organization. Even in the South Tyrol after a decade of 
fascism the control mechanisms were never as strict as they were only a couple of years 
later after the establishment of National Socialism in Germany.121 
Yet, no matter how intense the South Tyroleans' effort to conform with national 
socialistic ideals was, Hitler had different intentions. Already in November and December 
1922 and in October 1923, during interviews with Italian newspapers, he had claimed that 
Germany's only possible policy in this matter was to assure Italy that for Germany the 
South Tyrolean problem does not exist.122 In "Mein Kampf' in 1926, he further explained 
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that in the case of the South Tyrol, Germany was not supposed to allow itself to be guided 
by "sentimental moments." He claimed that the propaganda for the South Tyrol and against 
fascist Italy was exaggerated and nothing but a concoction of Jewish conspiracy.123 
During a discussion with representatives of the South Tyrol in 1927 Hitler demanded the 
sacrifice of the South Tyrol and asked the South Tyroleans to understand that the interest of 
200,000 German-speaking people had to stand behind the national interest of Germany. 
Hitler expressed the same opinion in this "Secret Book" of 1928)24 Also, in 1928 Hitler 
met the Italian ideologue Tolomei and assured him that he did not care about the fate of the 
"four Alpine people living in Bozen and Meran."125 And in 1932, he told the South 
Tyroleans that they would become a bridge between the Italian and the German people.126 
Hitler's statements in regard to the South Tyrol not only stood in opposition to the 
ideology of race and space, but they also contradicted the official program of the German 
National Socialist party. Under point one, the National Socialists demanded "the 
unification of all Germans on the basis of the principle of self-determination to a German 
Reich." And point two added: "We demand equality for the German people with the other 
nations, the abolition of the peace treaties of Versailles and St. Germaine. We will not give 
up one German in the Sudetenland, in the South Tyrol, in Poland, in the colony Austria 
and in the nations succeeding the Austro-Hungarian empire." This sentence remained the 
same for the first four editions of the Nazi program, but in the fifth edition at the end of the 
1920's through Hitler's influence the word "South Tyrol" was replaced with the word 
"Alsace-Lorraine." 127 
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Hitler's reason for the sacrifice of the South Tyrol was the evolving friendship with 
fascist Italy. In 1922 he argued that Germany had to unite with the nationally reborn 
Italy.128 In "Main Kampf' he explained that Germany could only expect two European 
allies, Great Britain and Italy. For the alliance with Italy, the South Tyrol had to be 
sacrificed.129 In 1930 he elaborated that an alliance with Italy was important because Italy 
was confronted with the same problems as Germany. Not only were Italy and Germany 
ideologically close. Both nations also fought against French hegemony in Europe and 
against the French attempt to encircle the two nationalistic nations. Also, there were no 
major conflicts of territorial interests since Germany focused on Eastern territories and Italy 
had its prime interest in the Mediterranean. The only problem was the South Tyrol. Hitler, 
however, was ready to sacrifice that area to assure a rapprochement of Germany and Italy. 
In this sense, the South Tyrol was supposed to become a bridge between the two countries, 
rather than an area of conflict.130 Later during the 1930's the "Anschluss" of Austria 
became equally important for Hitler's renunciation of the South Tyrol. Hitler needed 
Mussolini's approval if he wanted to annex Austria. By the beginning of the Nazi regime 
Mussolini was not prepared to give this support. When the Austrian Chancellor Engelbert 
Dollfuss was assassinated by Nazis in 1934, Mussolini instantly moved Italian troops to 
the Brenner and declared that he was prepared to come to Austria's assistance if the Nazis 
invaded the country. Consequently, the Italian fascist leader pursued an even more anti-
German policy concluding the "Roman Protocol" with Austria and Hungary in 1934 and 
joining the Stresa front against Germany in 1935. Hitler knew that without Mussolini's 
approval, the "Anschluss" of Austria was not possible. The price for this approval was 
once again the South Tyrol.131 
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During the 1920's Italian-German relations had been relatively without conflict. 
The Treaty of Locarno in autumn 1925, in which Germany guaranteed its western frontier, 
had led to intensified demand for revisionism on Germany's eastern and southeastern 
frontiers. During the pre-Locarno discussions Mussolini had demanded a guarantee of the 
Brenner frontier but did not succeed in his attempt. On the contrary, Germany explicitly 
refused to recognize the Brenner. Consequently, his attitude toward Germany remained 
skeptical.132 Hitler had tried to approach Mussolini even before his ascendancy to power. 
But the fascist leader ofltaly retained his distance from Hitler. Yet, the African crisis and 
Italy's war in Ethiopia in 1935-1936 forced an Italian-German rapprochement. Mussolini's 
war had not earned the applause of the other nations in Europe. Only Germany recognized 
the creation of Italian empire in Ethiopia. The League of Nations rejected Italy's takeover 
of Ethiopia which eventually, in December 1937, led to Italy's removal from the 
League.133 A further step toward an alliance between the two nations was the assistance 
both nations gave General Franco's Army in the Spanish Civil War in 1936. The 
rapprochement of the two nations found its expression in the creation of the "Axis Berlin-
Rome," when Mussolini finally in November 1, 1936 publicly announced the German-
Italian friendship treaty. The "Anticomintern-Pact" of the two nations with Japan in 
November 1936 and the "Pact of Steel," a military alliance between Italy and Germany, in 
May 1939 gave the final blessing to the alliance.134 
Despite Hitler's public renunciation of the South Tyrol and despite the development 
of the German-Italian friendship, the South Tyroleans' loyally continued to hope for an 
integration of their region with Nazi-Germany. For them Hitler's foreign policy was an 
indication that his remarks on the South Tyrol were tactically necessary steps. Few had 
read Mein Kampf and nobody trusted the censored South Tyrolean press, which actually 
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reported Hitler's negative remarks on the South TyroI.135 Decisive for the South Tyrolean 
attitude were several events during the 1930's. The plebiscite in the Saar on January 13, 
1935, where 90.7% of the population voted for the return to Germany, had been 
propagandized as the triumph of German National Socialism. The plebiscite, which had 
been guaranteed by the Versailles Treaty, seemed to indicate to the South Tyroleans that 
Hitler had begun to take the Germans "back home." Enthusiastically the South Tyroleans 
cried: "Today the Saar, we follow in a year." For the first time the South Tyroleans gave 
up their passive resistance and showed their willingness to protest openly.136 In March 
1936 Hitler terminated Locamo and marched into the Rhineland. On March 13, 1938 
Hitler annexed Austria. With the "Anschluss" Germany stood at the Brenner frontier. In 
1938 followed the incorporation of the Sudetenland and in 1939 the ddismemberment of 
Czechoslovakia. Hitler's policy of revision, his incorporation of territories, and the 
international reaction to these steps led the South Tyroleans to believe that the dynamics of 
this policy would not stop at the Brenner.137 Yet, it was exactly after the "Anschluss" of 
Austria when Hitler officially guaranteed the Brenner frontier to Italy. "I have drawn," he 
announced to Mussolini, "a clear German frontier to France and now I draw an equally 
clear line to Italy. It is the Brenner." 138 
Despite Hitler's remarks and promises, the South Tyrol remained an obstacle 
between the two nations. During Hitler's visit in Rome in May 1938, Mussolini confessed: 
"The past developments have shown, that this tribe can not [sic] be assimilated," therefore 
he promised that he would make some concessions to the German-speaking minority in the 
north as long as Hitler guaranteed the pacification of the area.139 By now, both Germany 
and Italy were interested in settling this question for once and for all. Therefore, on June 
135 Corsini, Sudtirol, 216. 
136 Corsini, Sudtirol, 249. 
137 Benedikt, Option, 121-23. 
138 Ritschel, Diplomatie, 125. 
139 Ritschel, Diplomatie, 151. 
The South Tyrol between Italian Fascism and German National Socialism 
L_ - - - - - - - - - - -
47 
23, 1939 the two dictatorial regimes decided to move the German-speaking South 
Tyroleans to German territory in the north and leave the South Tyrol with Italy. The two 
governments gave the South Tyroleans the option either to emigrate to Germany where the 
Nazis would give them the same amount of real estate they had in the South Tyrol or to 
remain in the South Tyrol and become "good Italians." At first, the South Tyroleans' 
reaction was fierce rejection of Hitler's offer to "come home into the Reich."140 But soon 
the Nazi oriented VKS succeeded in convincing their fellow countrymen that the South 
Tyroleans' resettlement in Germany was a necessary "sacrifice." German authorities had 
convinced them that national socialist ideology not only demanded race and space but also 
the "unconditional confession for the Third Reich" which decided upon the fate of the 
whole Germanic Volk. Not obeying the Reich's call equaled a refusal to obey an order.141 
The propaganda that evolved on both sides during the months following the June 
discussions, eventually divided the German-speaking South Tyroleans population into two 
hostile camps, those remaining and those who opted for Germany. Nazi authorities 
became increasingly interested in a resettlement of the total population. The Reich needed 
the South Tyroleans labor force. Furthermore, South Tyroleans were an exemplary 
German tribe suitable for the re-Germanization of border territory. Therefore the VKS 
propagandized that the South Tyroleans would receive an area the size of the South Tyrol 
or even bigger somewhere within the German expanded Reich where they could all settle 
together and live in the same neighborhoods as in their hometowns. In Autumn 1939 
German authorities offered newly conquered territory in Poland. But many older South 
Tyroleans who had fought on Polish territory in World War I remembered that area and 
refused to move there. Eventually the whole South Tyrolean leadership was against that 
plan and succeeded in bringing it to failure.142 Subsequently, in June 1940, Hitler offered 
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French Burgundy as an area of settlement. This territory, however, could only be settled 
after a peace-treaty with France which would force French authorities to pay off the 
population in the Burgundy. Such a peace treaty never came into being.143 After the 
conquest of Yugoslav territory, German authorities developed yet another plan. The South 
Tyroleans were supposed to be resettled in Southern Styria on former Yugoslavian 
territory. During the following months, however, the Nazis moved a variety of other 
emigrants from the Reich to that area.144 The last territory proposed for South Tyrolean 
resettlement was the Crimean peninsula. Also, with this plan it was clear that the war had 
to be over to fulfill it.145 
German propaganda for establishing a closed resettlement was extremely influential 
on the South Tyrolean population. Nazi Germany promised the South Tyroleans not only 
an equal territory, but also better farms, more land, and good job opportunities. The Italian 
propaganda, on the other hand, did little to encourage the German-speaking inhabitants of 
Northern Italy to remain in their home-country. By August 1939, the rumor, that the 
fascists would transfer all people remaining in the South Tyrol to Sicily, spread among the 
South Tyroleans. During the following months Italian authorities did not disclaim this 
propaganda since they thought it would help to drive the most hostile "elements" out of the 
country. By October 1939, however, the fascists realized that the result of the Options for 
Germany would be much higher than Italy expected and that a resettlement of the total 
population was more likely than a transfer of only part of the population into the German 
Reich. They argued that if an estimated 80% of the South Tyroleans left the country, the 
region would economically be ruined. Such a result would indicate to the world the 
complete failure of fascist Italianization. Therefore, local fascist leaders, and in March 
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1940 Mussolini himself denied the truth of the "Sicilian legend" and promised the South 
Tyroleans that they could remain in their home-country.146 
The deadline for the Options in the South Tyrol was December 31, 1939. At the 
beginning of January the results of the Options were published by both German and Italian 
authorities. These figures differ greatly, varying from 72% to 90%. According to 
historians, who have settled with a compromise, 86% of the South Tyroleans had opted to 
transfer to Nazi-Germany. The first social strata who started moving northwards were the 
poorer classes of the towns, people without landed property who had nothing to lose in a 
country where they had to convert to Italian Fascism in order to receive a job. According to 
the Italo-German agreement the people who had voted to migrate were supposed to have 
been transferred to the Reich until the end of 1942. The resettlement-process, however, 
slowed down considerably as the war-operations increased. By 1945 almost 75,000, or 
30%, of about 200,000 South Tyroleans had moved to the Third Reich.147 After the war 
an estimated 20,000 to 25,000 of those came back to their home country and reapplied for 
Italian citizenship.148 
The era of the Options, however, had opened a deep gap among the German-
speaking population of the South Tyrol. Those remaining were in the minority and were 
repeatedly exposed to persecution from those who had opted to migrate. They were treated 
like betrayers of their country, their nationality, their blood, and their neighborhood and 
were called Jews or "Walsche," a derogatory term for "Italians." Friedl Volgger, who later 
became an influencial South Tyrolese politician, had opted to stay in the South Tyrol and 
consequently, after 1943, ended up in the concentration camp Dachau. He explained: 
"What the Jews were in the German Reich, were now part of the South Tyroleans in the 
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eyes of their fanatical compatriots. 11 149 The hatred between the two groups did not know 
any confines. Children left their parents, neighbors burned their neighbors' houses, priests 
fought each other from the pulpit.150 In 1943 when Hitler's troops finally marched into the 
South Tyrol the situation of those who had opted to remain became even worse. Those 
who had opted to migrate, now in charge of the region, could legally persecute the 
opponents of the Reich and in their eyes those who had opted to stay were anti-Nazis. Not 
even the end of the war was able to close the gap the Options had opened among the 
people. In 1945 those who had opted to migrate were marked as Nazis and in the early 
post-war years were excluded from political participation. For decade, the two groups 
continued to nourish their hatred against each other. 
In September 1943, the pro-national socialist parties in the South Tyrol hoped that 
their most intimate wishes would soon be fulfilled. On July 25, 1943, Italian fascism 
collapsed and on September 3 Italy signed the armistice with the Allies. During the night 
from September 8 to September 9, Nazi troops took over large parts of the Italian 
peninsula, disarmed the Italian troops and placed the territory under Nazi-German 
administration. The South Tyrol rejoiced and hoped for 11 Anschluss 11 with the German 
Reich, but their hopes were in vain. Hitler's loyalty to Mussolini, whom German soldiers 
on September 12, 1943 freed from Italian imprisonment and brought to Berlin, continued 
to exist. Hitler put Mussolini in charge of the 11 Republica Sociale ltaliana, 11 the Italian 
Socialist Republic which had been established on September 9. For Hitler the breakdown 
of fascism and the obvious will of the Italians to return to democracy was more than a 
political loss. It was the rejection of the national socialist system.151 Hence, the South 
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Tyrol was not directly connected to the German Reich, but it was made part of the German-
influenced "Pre-Alpine Operation-Zone," which consisted of a larger northern Italian 
territory. In that region the former pro-Nazi parties took over and established a German-
oriented administration. German authorities either dismissed Italian officials or, more 
often, put them under the supervision of a German official. The South Tyrol therefore was 
officially still controlled by Italian authorities. Until the end of the war, Hitler did not 
change his policy towards the South Tyrol. In 1938 he had promised the Brenner frontier 
to Mussolini and he kept this promise even after he heard of Mussolini's assassination in 
1945.152 
South Tyrolean integration into Italy meant an enormous loss of social prestige and 
of national integrity for the German-speaking inhabitants of that area. Historian Leopold 
Steurer explains that the situation did not only amplify the century-old archrivalry between 
Austria and Italy, but it also threw the South Tyroleans from being a supporting part of the 
Austro-Hungarian empire into the status of a needy minority within Italy.153 Historian 
Martha Verdorfer explains that for the South Tyroleans Italy's betrayal of the Triple 
Alliance and its intervention in the war on the Allies' side had contributed to Austria's 
defeat in World War I. This further advanced the South Tyroleans' negative attitude 
towards everything that was Italian.154 Fascist ltalianization increased South Tyrolean 
resentment against Italy and also promoted the loss of the South Tyroleans' feeling for 
"home." Tolomei's policy deprived them of the opportunity to participate actively in the 
daily political, community life. Fascist assimilation policy, according to historian Rolf 
Steininger, was the prime factor for the increase in irredentist sentiments. Austria, the 
South Tyroleans' mother-country, was not in the condition to nurture these sentiments. 
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Thus, by the time Hitler rose to power the South Tyroleans were more than ready not only 
to accept Nazi Germany as their new leading figure, but to become loyal followers of Hitler 
and finally even to sacrifice their home in order to escape Italian Fascism. lSS Through 
Hitler they expected the return to a German national identity, or even more, to the German 
nation, which would guarantee them their traditions and permit them to speak their 
language and govern their region. In July 1945 the Italian newspaper "Il Quotidiano" 
recognized that the South Tyroleans' resentment against fascist Italy was the primary mover 
for their decision to leave their homes in 1939. "Many," the newspaper reported, "who did 
not even have any sympathy for the German Reich, keen Catholics and socialists, only 
voted for the German Reich because they wanted to escape this hell. Nothing is more 
representative than the fact that the Ladin-speaking population, whose language is much 
closer to the Italian language than to the German, voted ... for the German Reich." 1S6 
Hitler, however, despite his ideology of race and space, elsewhere applied 
unconditionally, sacrificed the South Tyrol to the politically needed alliance with Italy. 
Historian Karl Stuhlpfarrer explains that the South Tyrol was the example of the 
contradiction between the policy of Volkstum and the different interests of two fascist 
systems. On the one hand, the South Tyrol was the object of Nazi revisionist foreign 
policy and, on the other hand, it was the object of Hitler's alliance-policy with Italy. A 
consistent fulfillment of the policy of Volkstum required a war with Italy. A successful 
alliance with Italy demanded the unconditional promise of the Brenner frontier. Cultural 
autonomy for the German-speaking minority in Italy's north, at this point, was not a 
possibility, since the protection of minorities contradicted fascist and national socialist 
ideology)S7 Therefore, the dictatorial regimes resorted to the practice of solving ethnic 
conflicts through the resettlement of minorities into their mother-country. The South 
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Tyroleans were not the only people subject to such solutions. Through bilateral agreements 
between Germany and the Soviet Union, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and 
Croatia throughout the war-years between 770,000 and 930,000 people were resettled.158 
Whether Hitler's intentions in the case of South Tyrol were only tactical promises 
or whether he ever intended to annex the South Tyrol is to remain speculation. The Nazis' 
consistent pursuit of the Options and Hitler's reaction to the collapse of fascist Italy lead to 
opposite conclusions. The alliance with Mussolini was more than a political necessity. 
The Axis Berlin-Rome was the expression of the devotion of two ideologically close 
dictatorial states. Hitler, whose admiration for the Italian leader had been well known 
already during the 1920's, eventually became the leading figure in this alliance, but even 
then he was not willing to reconsider his decisions in the South Tyrol. On the contrary, in 
this case he put ideology aside for his loyalty to Mussolini. The South Tyrol, once again, 
became the plaything for political necessities of major powers. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESTATE THE DECISION OF 1919: THE SOUTH TYROL 
QUESTION AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE IN 1945 
At the end of World War II the South Tyroleans once again hoped that the Allies 
and their principle of bringing about a lasting peace for Europe would revise the Bremier 
frontier and that the South Tyrol would return to Austria. Indeed, the Allies' and especially 
the United States' attitude during the first months after the war allowed them to establish 
their own political representation; and with Austria's backing a successful plea for re-
integration into their former home-country seemed likely. Yet, the national and 
international situation changed the Allies' position very rapidly. After all, Austria had been 
fighting the war on Hitler's side and had unconditionally surrendered. On the other hand, 
the Allies recognized Italy's state of co-belligerency. Also, the war time-alliance between 
the democratic West and Communist Russia soon broke up and with it disappeared the 
opportunities for territorial changes. Secure as much territory as possible for each front 
was the new policy of the "Big Four." Both in Italy and Austria the Communist threat 
upset the political scene. While occupied Austria for some time seemed to be lost to the 
Western world, the Western Allies tried to refrain from any action which could destabilize 
the Italian political situation and result in a serious drift to the left. As in 1919, the 
questions around the Trieste area became the major issue in the Italian peace treaty and also 
became a test-case for the struggle between East and West. Consequently, the Council of 
Foreign Ministers settled the other areas concerning the Italian peace rather rapidly. The 
debate about the South Tyrol question was accordingly short. Ethnic arguments no longer 
seemed to be a concern. In the end the South Tyrol was to remain with Italy. The only 
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improvement the Austrian government could achieve during the Paris Peace Conference in 
1945/46 was a last minute agreement with Italy, in which the Italian government promised 
a degree of autonomy to the German-speaking minority in the north of Italy. 
At the end of the war Italy enjoyed a better status than all the other former Axis 
powers or Axis satellites. Although former enemy, Italy could also cherish hopes that it 
would be accepted as a co-belligerent. After all, it had fought on the allied side since 
summer 1943. The efforts to achieve the status of co-belligerency concentrated mainly on 
the United States. In the United States the Italians could rely on many support groups 
formed by the large Halo-American population. The Italian Foreign ministry and Italian 
diplomatic representatives in America coordinated the activities of these groups. Many 
groups such as the "New Jersey Council for Relations between the United States and 
Italy", the "Free Italy", the "Mazzini Society", and the "Sons ofltaly" actively sustained the 
Italian claim for a just peace. The most active of these groups was certainly the "Committee 
for a Just Peace with Italy" in New York. It influenced American public opinion through a 
flood of newspaper articles, memoranda, and manifestosl59 and also had influential 
representatives in Congress.160 Already during spring, 1945 these groups showed their 
influence when Italy requested admission to the United Nations. The Italian case received 
voice in the speeches of several members of the American delegation at the San Francisco 
meeting of the United Nations at the end of May, 1945.161 The efficiency of the public 
pressure became evident a couple of months later when public opinion within the United 
States forced the government to publicize the Italian armistice terms.162 
159 Ilaria Poggiolini, Diplomazia deUa transizione. Gli alleati e ii problema del trattato di pace 
italiano ( 1945-1947), (Florenz: Gruppo editoriale fiorentino, 1990), 60. 
160 see Congressional Records, various declarations asking the President to fight for the Italian 
case. 
161 Minutes of the Sixty-eigth Meeting of the United States Delegation, June 11, 1945, in 
Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers (Washington DC: United States Government 
Prinitng Office, 1966), 1945, I:l239. 
l 62 The American Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs (De 
Gasperi), November 5, 1945, in Foreign Relations, IV: 1080-81. 
Restate the Decision of 1919: The South Tyrol at the Paris Peace Conference in 1945 
I_ - - - - - - - - - - - - -
56 
The aims of the groups coincided with the maximalist demands of the Italian 
government. In the New York Times of February 12, 1946 the "Committee for a Just 
Peace with Italy" asked for a peace for Italy along the Wilson-line in Yugoslavia, for the 
maintenance of the South Tyrol and the colonies, the exclusion from reparations, the end of 
the restriction of Italian sovereignty, and the admission of Italy to the United Nations.163 
The influence of the Italian support groups within America on United States foreign policy 
should not be underestimated, expressed Luigi Antonini of the "Italian American Labour 
Council." He reminded the American government of the six million Halo-American 
votes.164 Throughout the months following the war the United States firmly came to 
support Italy's claim for co-belligerency. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes assured the 
Italian government that the United States had "always desired Italy to take her place in the 
post-war world as a real factor for peace and progress in Europe."165 Consequently the 
Italians believed in a peace "with" Italy, a peace adapted to Italy's collaboration. But the 
peace negotiations were protracted and the international situation changed against Italy's 
favor. In the end, instead of receiving a reward for its collaboration, the Allies imposed a 
harsh and punitive peace which deprived her not only of her colonies but also of the 
territories along the Dalmatian coast. It was a peace on the basis of new international 
realities. 166 
Despite the Allies' acceptance of Italy as a co-belligerent a series of difficult 
problems disrupted Italy's internal peace during the two years following World War II. 
Domestically a major economic crisis, shattering food shortage, and especially severe 
political disintegration exposed the country to the constant threat of internal turmoil. The 
situation became increasingly stabilized towards the end of 1946, but it was still far from 
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normal. Internationally, the continuing negotiations for the peace treaty, which involved 
major territorial discussions, multiplied both hostile and friendly attitudes towards the 
nation. The first postwar coalition government under Ferruccio Parri' s could withstand 
those pressures only until December 1945.167 On December 9 the coalition collapsed 
because of internal party struggles, introducing the pattern of governmental breakdown, 
that would become an Italian peculiarity for the following decades. The Christian Democrat 
Alcide De Gasperi then formed a new coalition government with the six major parties. On 
May 9, 1946 growing opposition forced King Emanuel ill to abdicate the throne. His son 
Humbert II, who became king after him, had to submit to the referendum on June 2, 1946 
wherein the majority of the people voted for a future Republican Italy thus abolishing 
monarchy. The Constituent Assembly on June 25, 1946 elected Enrico De Nicola the 
provisional President of the Republic of Italy. De Gasperi remained Prime Minister with a 
coalition of Christian Democrats, Socialists, Communists, and Republicans.168 
As the "battle for peace" went on De Gasperi's government took up the tactics of 
negotiating through the threat of not signing a punitive peace. Confronted with reality, at 
the beginning of 1946, Italy concluded that even if the nation was impotent against the 
strength of the four powers negotiating the peace, it was still able to create problems.169 
De Gasperi's interventions with the governments in France, Great Britain, and the United 
States were manifold. He especially concentrated on the United States where he could 
hope for substantial support. Already in August De Gasperi sent a memorandum to Byrnes 
regarding the Italian demands 170 and on September 4, 1945 a summary of Italian claims 
reached President Truman.171 In May 1946 the Italian Ambassador Alberto Tarchini 
167 Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations. 
July 1, 1945 - December 31, 1946 (Princeton Univerisity Press, 1948), VIII:l83. 
168 Dennett, Documents, VIII:l84. 
169 Poggiolini, Diplomazia, 59. 
170 The Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs (De Gasperi) to the Secretary of State, August 22, 
1945, in Foreign Relations, 1945, III: 1026-27. 
l 71 Summary of Italian Views for an Equitable Solution of the Principal Questions which May 
Be Discussed at the London Peace Conference, September 4, 1945, in Foreign Relations, 1945, I: 106. 
Restate the Decision of 1919: The South Tyrol at the Paris Peace Conference in 1945 
58 
visited the President himself defending the Italian position. The State Department reported 
that during this conversation Truman had shown himself most favorable to the Italian 
claims.172 
Besides internal pressure, the United States government's positive attitude toward 
Italy during the peace negotiations was determined by the policy to maintain Italy for the 
Western world. The Soviets' disposition toward Italy was not unfavorable. Despite the 
decisions of summer, 1943 the Soviet Union had been forced to give up its participation in 
Italy's occupational regime.173 But the Soviet Union did not blame the Italian government 
for that and although it demanded reparations from Italy, it did not support French and 
Austrian demands for Italian territory. Although the Soviets supported Yugoslavian 
demands for the Trieste-area, they laid the blame for the tense situation on the Italian-
Yugoslav border on the Western Allies. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the war a 
large Communist party constantly threatened Italy's political stability and Italy's Prime 
Minister De Gasperi keenly used the threat of the influence of the Communists in Italy 
when arguing for Italy's demands.174 Therefore, the United States not only tried to free 
the country from its "Fascist past" but also promised help in the political and economic 
reconstruction in order to build a democratic bastion in ltaly.175 Consequently, in winter 
1946, the United States took lively interest in the election of an Italian Constituent 
Assembly.176 To the United States, Italy's political future was unp~edictable, especially if 
the peace was to be a punitive one. Italy had to be encouraged to "look West." In 1946 
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Truman favored an extension of the Lend-Lease funds to ltaly177 and in August 1946 
Byrnes promised Italy 125 million Dollars as a refund for the services offered by Italy 
throughout the occupation.178 
On the other hand, in the immediate aftermath of the war, the English attitude 
towards Italy was not favorable at all. Although England accepted Italy's status of co-
belligerency, the memories of the war against Italy were still present and soon England 
took on a very pragmatic attitude claiming Italian colonies. From the English point of view 
the United States psychologically had never been in a state of war with Italy and also had 
never considered the Italians as real enemies.179 Still in July 1945 Great Britain wanted 
either a "completely and permanently subjugated Italy" or an Italy as a second class power 
which, however, would be strong enough "to give the west time to mobilize itself against 
the east." As a compromise the British offered to create an Italy kept in suspense as to 
"whether her place is in the sun or shadow." 180 Although in August 1945 English Foreign 
Minister Ernest Bevin announced that Great Britain's punitive treatment of Italy was over, 
he also underlined that Italy should not forget that it was among the defeated nations.181 
This became again evident in September when Great Britain presented its "Draft Heads of 
Treaty with Italy." The draft demanded a very punitive peace for Italy and American 
authorities asked the British to moderate their language in Italy's regard because such 
unnecessarily harsh language "would result in ltal resentment which in turn could be used 
to alienate Ital opinion." 182 England's policy toward Italy throughout the peace 
negotiations remained suspicious. When the British Foreign Office in March, 1946 
discovered some Italian statistics that evidently contained wrong numbers, Margaret Carlyle 
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of the Research Department summarized the English view calling the Italian claims 
"dishonest - as so often with the Italians."183 
Austria, on the other hand, at the end of the war was left almost without support. 
Defeated, occupied, and shaken by famines, diseases, and disorder the country had little 
chance to increase its position. General Eisenhower maintained that these people were "so 
disarmed, both economically and in a military sense, that they cannot make war again."184 
Although the Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1943 accepted Austria's status as the 
first victim of Nazi Germany, during the peace negotiations Austria was still treated like a 
Nazi collaborator and aggressor. Since the Moscow Declaration the Allies' policy toward 
Austria was consistently driven by four basic objectives: The re-establishment of Austria as 
a free and independent state, the creation of conditions that could uphold the democracy of 
the country, assurance of an economic base which could help the country to become 
independent as soon as possible, and the restoration of Austria as an equal member within 
the European system.185 The United States adopted these principles officially as the basis 
for the post-war settlement of Austria in 1944.186 On August 8, 1945 the country, 
reestablished in its 1937 boundaries, was divided into four occupation zones and the city of 
Vienna was jointly occupied by France, Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet 
Union.187 As the occupation went on, it became more and more apparent, that the Soviet 
Union tried to expand its influence beyond what had been agreed upon by the four powers. 
Therefore the Anglo-American Allies became increasingly suspicious of the Austrian 
government and began to see the Austrian government under Dr. Karl Renner as a puppet 
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regime of Moscow. The Austrian people undermined these fears somewhat as they were 
called to elections on November 25, 1945. The Communists received only 5.4 percent of 
the votes and Austria seemed secure to the Western World. The consequences were double 
edged. The Soviets changed their attitude towards Austria and "thanks to their new 
harshness toward Austria" opposed every proposal the Austrian government made.188 On 
the other hand, the Allied Council in Austria already on December 18, 1945 recommended 
the recognition of the Austrian government formed by Chancellor Leopold Figl. On 
January 7, 1946 the United States recognized Austria and congratulated Dr. Karl Renner on 
his election to the presidency of the Austrian Republic.189 A couple of months later the 
United States government fully recognized Austria as a liberated country.190 
Detrimental for the South Tyrol question was Austria's position in the immediate 
aftermath of the war. Austria's economic situation was even more desperate than the 
situation in Italy. The country was devastated by the war. For months the country lived on 
Russian "Iwan-beans". At the same time a wave of refugees swept over the boundaries. 
The division of the country into four occupation zones further obstructed Austrian recovery 
since there was almost no communication between the zones.191 The Western Allies' fear 
that Austria would be incorporated into the Soviet system seemed to become reality. 
Already in December 1944 American authorities in Europe expressed their fears that the 
Soviets' insistence on keeping not only Germany but also Austria occupied until the 
conclusion of the peace could seriously "influence the pattern of postwar settlement" and 
bring about an unfavorable settlement for Western democracies.192 For all these reasons in 
autumn, 1945 and spring, 1946 Austria did not have a voice in the international scenario. 
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Despite the internal circumstances of Italy and Austria, at the end of the war the 
South Tyroleans nourished hopes to return to Austria. Especially the United States seemed 
determined to put right what in 1919 went wrong. On June 8, 1944 the Committee on 
Post-War Programs presented its views on future Austria. Therein the Committee 
announced that it was in the United States long-term interest to recognize Austria not as an 
aggressor but as a victim. Therefore, the return of the South Tyrolean territory with minor 
adjustments in "accordance with the distribution of the linguistic group" would not 
contradict the peace terms. The Committee argued that the territory was Austrian in 
-
history, culture, and tradition and could help in the economic reconstruction of devastated 
Austria.193 In the final draft of the report the Committee therefore suggested that "the 
Austrian-Italian frontier should be rectified by the cession of the Italian province of Bolzano 
subject to minor adjustments." 194 The memorandum was approved by President Roosevelt 
and henceforth represented the official United States Policy toward Austria.195 
The Department of State indeed followed these guidelines until the end of 1945. At 
the end of the war, on American official in the South Tyrol allowed the creation of a South 
Tyrolean party, the "Stidtiroler Volkspartei," or "South Tyrolean People's Party." Thus 
the American occupation forces basically furnished South Tyrol with a political mouthpiece 
and at the same time, in the eyes of the South Tyroleans, accepted their equality with Italian 
parties and their affiliation to Austria.196 Throughout the summer arid autumn of 1945 the 
Department of State also refused to remove the Allied Military Government in the South 
Tyrol and explained that this territory could still be a danger spot in Europe. Also, the 
Department did not want to predetermine the outcome of the peace negotiations by handing 
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the South Tyrol back to Italian administration. In addition, it was not indisposed to a 
solution of the South Tyrol question through an Allied supervised plebiscite." 197 
Again, these directions did not coincide with the English attitude. Great Britain, 
although it maintained its harsh attitude toward Italy, seemed to have changed its directives 
on returning the South Tyrol already in spring, 1945. According to American authorities, 
the British Foreign Office had changed its attitude on the South Tyrol questions as early as 
April 28, 1945. Great Britain now was of the opinion that the South Tyrol should remain 
within Italy. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Advisor to the Supreme Allied Commander, 
argued that the change in the British perspective had taken place because of the 
developments in Austria. The British Foreign Office had made special reference to the 
Soviet influence in Austria and had expressed its doubt about the future role of Austria in 
Europe.198 In August, Kirk also criticized two British reports on the South Tyrol in which 
British officials claimed that the South Tyroleans, although against a full integration into 
Italy, strove for "national independence under Allied guarantees" or for considerable 
autonomy within Italy as a second choice, but not for a return to Austria. Kirk advised that 
both reports were colored by British official policy and should therefore be handled with 
utmost caution.199 The British also strongly supported the removal of the Allied Military 
Government in the South Tyrol and intervened several times with United States authorities 
to achieve this goal. Finally on November 14, 1945 the Department of State gave in and 
"in view of the delay in the Italian peace treaty" decided that the South Tyrol should return 
to Italian administration simultaneously with the other provinces on January 1, 1946.200 
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Curiously enough, by then the decision to retain the South Tyrol within Italy had 
already been made. The initiating power was the United States. On September 14, 1945 
the United States Delegation presented a memorandum about the Italian peace treaty at the 
third meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Contrary to the United States' official 
policy, this memorandum suggested "that the frontier with Austria would be unchanged, 
subject to hearing any case which Austria might present for minor rectification in her 
favor." The Council of Foreign Ministers accepted the proposal without discussion and 
passed the memorandum on to the Deputies of the nations so that the directives in the 
American document could guide them in the drafting of the peace with Italy.201 
Apparently, Italian promises to grant the South Tyrol autonomy had not only 
influenced the British attitude which underlined that the maintenance of the Allied Military 
Government in the South Tyrol was not supposed to prejudice Italian plans for local 
autonomy in that region.202 On August 22, 1945 Foreign Minister De Gasperi in his claim 
for the maintenance of the frontier at the Brenner had included a promise to grant an 
autonomy to the South Tyroleans.203 Some days later President Truman received a 
memorandum wherein the Italian government promised to "give the most large and 
guaranteed autonomy to the German minorities that live together with the Italians in upper 
Adige, applying to the full extent also in this region ... all democratic principles of 
individual and collective liberties. "204 The Secretary of State noted this statement of the 
Italians with pleasure because it reflected Italy's serious intentions to repudiate "the futile 
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methods and spirits of the past." Byrnes added that the United States would watch "with 
keen interest the implementation of this policy of tolerance and understanding. 11205 
During the following months both Italy and Austria repeatedly submitted their 
claims for the South Tyrol to the victorious governments. The Italian government argued 
that maintaining Italy's northern frontier at the Brenner was a political-moral issue. The 
Italian government stressed the Nazi past of both Austria and the South Tyrol and claimed 
that the events during the Options were the best example to show the South Tyroleans' 
support of Nazi Germany. In his August letter to Byrnes, Italian Foreign Minister and 
future Prime Minister De Gasperi also underlined that the Options had not been a reaction 
against fascism but rather the result of a collaboration between German and South Tyrolean 
Nazi circles.206 Italian authorities used this argument anxiously throughout the 
negotiations for an Italian peace treaty. In February 1946 Italian Prime Minister De Gasperi 
stressed that the Austrian Republic could always be drawn back into the "pan-German 
orbit" and that the South Tyroleans would only enforce such tendencies, since they had 
"proved too accessible to the Third Reich's Hitler myth." Sometimes De Gasperi would 
also return to the Fascist slogan that the South Tyroleans were actually of Italian origin. In 
an interview given to the New York Times on February 4, 1946, he said, that the 
population in the South Tyrol consisted of "ignorant peasants who, though mostly of 
Italian stock, were still afraid the Germans would come back and, therefore, feared to admit 
they were Italian. 11207 
Economic arguments added to Italy's claim. The Italian government stressed the 
importance of the hydro-electric power stations built by Mussolini's regime in the South 
Tyrol which furnished North Italian industry with energy. Also, Italy would lose much of 
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the natural resources of the South Tyrol that had come to play an important role in Italy's 
economy. If Italy lost the South Tyrolean economic force, its economic reconstruction was 
in serious danger. 208 In addition, the Italian government argued that a return of the South 
Tyrol would deprive Italy of its natural border and of the security of the northern 
frontier. 209 
Also, the Austrian government continuously intervened at the governments of the 
Western Allies demanding the return of the South Tyrol. Three times during the autumn of 
1945 United States' Political Advisor for Austrian Affairs, Erhardt, reported to Washington 
that the Austrian government continued to ask for United States' support in their attempt to 
obtain the reintegration of the South TyroI.210 Austria repeatedly argued that the territory 
was both politically and economically important for Austrian prosperity. The South Tyrol 
connected the Northern Tyrol with the Eastern Tyrol. Without the roads and rail routes 
connecting the two provinces the traffic connections within Austria were severely 
disturbed. Furthermore, the South Tyrol could provide Austria with grain, milk, butter, 
and fruit, thus counteracting the disastrous food shortage. The electric power would 
compensate Austria for its lack of coal. In addition, the South Tyrol had always been the 
country's main tourist attraction. Also, the return of the South Tyrol could help the 
cultivation of Austrian self-consciousness.211 Jtaly's retention of the region, on the other 
hand, would permanently poison the Halo-Austrian relationship which would be the 
cornerstone of long-term instability in central Europe.212 
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Austria also made several proposals to solve the problem of the hydro-electric 
power station and offered the Italian government to export major parts of the energy 
produced in the South TyroJ.213 Austria, however, was not prepared to accept Italy's offer 
to grant an autonomy to the German-speaking minority in the South Tyrol. The Austrian 
government frequently stated, that it did not have any confidence in the Italian government 
and even less in the promises Italy made. The Italians had made similar promises already 
after World War I and had not kept them.214 Austria maintained this position until the last 
moment and included its disbelief in Italy's goodwill in its comment on the draft for Italy's 
Peace Treaty on August 30, 1946.215 
Throughout autumn and winter of 1945/46 Austria continued to claim the whole 
South Tyrol, a fact that irritated the Council of Foreign Ministers because it reflected 
Austria's unwillingness to collaborate with the peacemakers. Yet, the Austrian government 
had not been informed of the decision of September 14, 1945 and therefore continued to 
negotiate for the highest claims.216 Only on May 1, 1946 the Council of Foreign Ministers 
decided to officially inform the Austrian government of the September 14 agreement and to 
encourage her to submit a proposal for "minor rectification" of the South Tyrolean border 
in Austria's favor.217 By Spring 1946 the Western Allies' attitude towards the South Tyrol 
had undergone a significant change. 
At the beginning of 1946 United States' official policy shifted towards an anti-
South Tyrolean policy. On January 3, 1946 the Chief of the Division of Central European 
Affairs, Riddleberger, still maintained that it was the United States' obligation to subvert 
the injustice that the peace of St. Germain had imposed upon the South Tyrol in 1919. 
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Riddleberger argued that if the Council of Foreign Ministers would decide to take up the 
question of the South Tyrol again, despite the September decision, the United States should 
support a return of the South Tyrol to Austria or at least stand for holding a plebiscite.218 
Yet, a few days later another American official in Europe, the Chief of the Division of 
Southern European Affairs, Reber, wrote that the United States could not support Austria's 
quest for the South Tyrol. The decision of 1919, he argued, was only the "retribution of 
the unjust settlement imposed by Austria in 1866." Italy justly feared the revival of a Pan-
German threat. Also, Austria fought on the side of the Nazis until the end, while Italy was 
a co-belligerent. Besides, Italy had strong economic reasons to back up her request. The 
most important factor for Reber, however, was the political issue: All parties, including the 
Communists, demanded the South Tyrol. Without the Allies' recognition of that wish, no 
Italian government, no matter of what political persuasion, would sign a peace treaty.219 
The two opposing officials then issued a common memorandum which was supposed to be 
the guideline for the United States' future policy toward the South Tyrol. The United 
States was supposed to oppose the cession of the South Tyrol to Austria and was only to 
support the idea of holding a plebiscite in that area. 220 
At the same time, British interests now altered to a more positive view towards the 
South Tyrol. Being aware of the September agreement, in March British authorities 
prepared a draft compromise proposal on the South Tyrol. Austrian Foreign Minister Dr. 
Karl Gruber inspired the draft and the British officials therefore demanded that it had be 
held secretly. The American Political Advisor for Austria, Erhardt, argued that the 
knowledge about Gruber's readiness to compromise could have profound political 
repercussions in Austria and South Tyrol. Great Britain's proposal drew a line 
218 Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs (Riddleberger), 
January 3, 1946, in Foreign Relations, 1946, V:286. 
219 Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of Southern European Affairs (Reber), 
January 7, 1945, in Foreign Relations, V:288-90. 
220 Memorandum by the Chif of the Division of Central European Affairs (Riddleberger) and the 
Acting Chief of the Division of Southern European Affairs (Reber) to the Director of the Office of 
European Affairs (Matthews), January 11, 1946, in Foreign Relations, 1946, V:291. 
Restate the Decision of 1919: The South Tyrol at the Paris Peace Conference in 1945 
I ________ _ 
69 
immediately south of Bozen, leaving Italy with the industrial complex built by the Fascists. 
The demarcation would leave the majority of Italians and Ladins within the Italian border 
and it would uphold the railroad connection between North and East TyroL.221 Yet, 
British policy, as prior the United States attitude, apparently was not unanimously accepted 
even by the British government. Foreign Minister Bevin presented the draft to the Council 
of Foreign Ministers on April 30, 1946. He added that the proposal was not definite and 
that he was open for all suggestions. 222 
At their meetings on April 30, and May 1, 1946 the Council of Foreign Ministers 
finally decided that Austria had not yet submitted a claim for minor rectification and that all 
its demands were not in accordance with the agreement of September 14, 1945. The 
Council of Foreign Ministers invited the Austrian government to present an offer that could 
be considered as complying with the September agreement and offered to direct their 
Deputies to listen to their views and compare them to the Italian standpoint.223 
Consequently, on May 10, the Austrian government submitted a draft that demanded the 
north-eastern corner of the South Tyrol which would guarantee an undisturbed 
communication system to Austria. On May 30 the Austrian and Italian government 
presented their views on the draft to the Deputies. After the hearing the Deputies decided 
that Austria's claim could not be considered a "minor rectification" but for further evidence, 
a committee of hydro-electric experts would investigate the case.224 . 
As a matter of fact, the discussions concerning the power stations was one of the 
chief reasons why the Allies finally rejected the return of the South Tyrol or even the return 
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of smaller territories. 225 On June 24, 1946 the Council of Foreign Ministers studied the 
report of the hydro-electric experts and consequently rejected the Austrian draft because it 
did not propose minor rectification. The Foreign Ministers concluded that the cession of 
any territory of the South Tyrol would bring some economic disadvantages to Italy. Yet, 
the French representative maintained that the report did not shed new light on the situation 
and that the question remained a political one.226 Besides the economic advantages for 
Italy, the United States and Great Britain had other reasons too for arguing for the 
maintenance of the hydro-electric power station within Italy. They feared that if Austria 
was to remain in the hands of the Soviets, the Russians would have a means to threaten 
Italy.227 
Very likely one of Gruber's statements before the Deputies on May 30, had also 
influenced the Council's decision. Gruber had argued that Austria made the claim for 
minor rectification only to comply with the decision of September 1945. Yet doing so, the 
Austrian government did not renounce its demands for the entire South Tyrol and intended 
to ask for a plebiscite for the remaining area before an international body. Hence, if the 
Council of Foreign Ministers decided to accept Austria's offer of minor rectification, it 
would still not provide a peaceful settlement of the question . Therefore, French 
representative Couve demanded that the decision should be made on the basis of whether 
the Four Powers consider it desirable to give Austria something at alI.228 Various other 
reasons inspired the decision of June 24, 1946. Despite its collaboration, the Foreign 
Ministers would impose a heavy peace on Italy and therefore were reluctant to add the 
South Tyrol to Italy's territorial sacrifices. The June decision was also pushed by the 
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growing tensions of the Western Allies with the Soviet Union. Austria's future with or 
without the South Tyrol seemed equally uncertain. In view of the growing divisions of the 
Foreign Ministers the United States and Great Britain urged for a fast conclusion of the 
Italian Treaty. 229 
Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber during June came to realize that the struggle for 
the South Tyrol was lost. On June 15, 1946 he proposed to initiate negotiations between 
Italy and Austria in order to solve the South Tyrol problem on a bilateral level. Acheson's 
arguments for the opening of bilateral negotiations appropriately summed up the reasons 
why the Foreign Ministers ultimately supported the idea. Acheson argued that even if the 
decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers was final it did not solve the ethnic problem of 
the South Tyrol at all. Also, the Austrian government obviously needed a "face-saving 
device" on the whole South Tyrol question. The failure to encourage Austro-Italian 
negotiations, Acheson maintained, endangered the position of the Austrian government and 
jeopardized the future Allied policy in Austria. A bilateral settlement ideally could provide 
the basis for an Austro-Italian economic cooperation, an arrangement which would be 
highly welcome for central Europe. Acheson advised Byrnes to impress Italy with the 
necessity of coming to an amicable solution with Austria.230 
Apparently, Acheson's arguments led Byrnes to put pressure on the Italian 
government to open negotiations with Austria. By now American officials were also 
getting tired of Italy's constant threat of not signing a peace. Byrnes therefore in July 1946 
accused the Italian government of ingratitude and reminded her that, after all, Italy was a 
defeated nation also. Byrnes maintained that the attitude of the Italian government 
threatened the peace negotiations, jeopardized the Italian peace treaty and caused nothing 
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but dissent. 231 American reaction confronted Italy with reality. The struggle was no 
longer between Italy or Austria, or in the case of Trieste, between Italy and Yugoslavia but 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, between East and West. Therefore, Italy 
reluctantly gave in to Anglo-American pressure and agreed to negotiate with Austria over an 
autonomy for the South Tyrol. 232 
On September 5, 1946 Italian Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi and Austrian 
Foreign Minister Karl Gruber signed the Austro-Italian Agreement.233 It laid the 
foundations for an autonomy for the German-speaking minority in northern Italy._ It 
promised the South Tyroleans schools in the German language, established the legal 
foundation for the equality of the inhabitants of the Province with Italian citizens of Italy, 
and it promised the revision of the Hitler-Mussolini Agreement of 1939. Furthermore it 
included provisions for an equal usage of the German and Italian language and an equal 
distribution of employment in public offices. Also, it guaranteed an autonomous legislative 
and executive administration for the region. Italy promised to fulfill part of the provisions 
within one year from the signing of the Treaty and recognized Austria's right to appeal to 
the United Nations, in case the promises were not fulfilled.234 
The agreement was deliberately made in vague terms. The South Tyrolean 
delegation at the conference was convinced that an agreement without too specific 
terminology would leave the doors open for later negotiations which could give them a 
chance to achieve what they could not accomplish in September 1946.235 Gruber 
recognized Austria's last chance when the Allies showed their willingness to put pressure 
on Italy to give guarantees for the security of the South Tyroleans and he took advantage of 
231 Poggiolini, Diplomazia, 61. 
232 Poggiolini, Diplomazia, 73-79; Ermacora, Geheimbericht, 147, 207 .. 
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it. Truly, the agreement showed many weaknesses and therefore it not only laid the 
foundations for future negotiations but also for future discord which would already begin 
the day after the signing of the agreement. Yet, it served its purpose; the Austro-Italian 
agreement, despite its many defects, became a "millstone around every Italian 
government. 11236 
In 1945/46 the South Tyrol fell prey to international antagonism. The evolving 
disruption between East and West which mounted to war-like tensions in the Trieste area 
influenced the Council of Foreign Ministers' position on the Italian peace treaty. Italy's 
domestic situation which threatened to end in turmoil should the South Tyrol be ceded to 
Austria, allowed the Western Allies to conclude that a serious drift to the left could 
ultimately put Italy under the Soviet sphere of influence. Austria, on the other hand, for 
some time seemed to be lost to the Western world in any case. Hence, the South Tyrol was 
run over by "big politics." It became a prey of international developments which neither 
Italy nor Austria were able to influence. As historian Rolf Steininger maintained, "the 
South Tyrol prematurely was caught in the mills of the cold war. 11237 
Italy's Foreign Minister and later Prime Minister De Gasperi apparently was well 
aware of the Western Allies' fear of the growth of the Soviets' influence and exploited this 
weak spot in the Western Allies' argumentation. He continuously not only emphasized the 
Brenner as a barrier against Austria as a representative of German nationalism and Pan-
Germanism. He also underlined that Austria was in the Soviet sphere of influence and that 
a return of the South Tyrol would enlarge the Soviets' territory. The South Tyrol therefore 
became less a matter of discord between Italy and Austria, but more a European matter 
236 Steininger, Los von Rom?, 59,177; The Austrian Delegation to the Secretary General of the 
Paris Peace Conference, September 6, 1946, in Foreign Relations, 1946, IV:808-09; The Italian 
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representative of the struggle between East and West.238 De Gasperi could not anticipate 
that ultimately the whole Italian quest would be caught in this struggle and Italy would lose 
more than it gained. For a long time the Western Allies were not able to detect the real 
extent of the prevailing attitude of Italian public opinion which was much less pro-
Communist than the Italian government made it sound. By late spring, 1946, however, the 
United States and Great Britain were convinced that Italy would not change its political 
orientation and felt sure that they could put pressure on Italy's government to negotiate with 
Austria despite the Communist threat. 239 
Despite the evidence of official support of the South Tyroleans' demand for return 
to Austria by the United States in 1945 and by Great Britain in 1946, apparently the official 
politics of both nations conflicted with other internal opinions. In the United States in 
summer and autumn of 1945 there had been a difference in opinion between those who felt 
that Italy was to play an important role in post-war European settlement and those who 
favored the Austrian claims. Officially, the United States wanted to make up for the 
mistakes of 1919 but during the London Conference in September 1945 the pro-Italian 
argument prevailed. 240 Almost the same situation arose in spring, 1946 in the British 
camp. While Great Britain now officially supported Austria's claim on the South Tyrol, 
Foreign Minister Bevin was of the opinion that the return of the South Tyrol to Austria 
would counteract the economic well-being of Italy and might also obstruct the free 
economic flow between north and south. Although a conflict of interests between the 
United States and Great Britain existed in regard to Italy, the representatives present at the 
Council of Foreign Ministers unanimously rejected the cession of the South Tyrol to 
Austria and ultimately, it was they who made the decisions. In 1919 strategic reasoning 
had prevailed, now the economic aspects became prevalent. 241 The economic 
238 Alcock, History, 96. 
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reconstruction of Europe was the basis for a long-lasting peace and for the maintenance of 
the central European powers in the Western camp. All economic considerations concerning 
the South Tyrol, however, spoke against a reintegration of the territory into Austria. 
Ethnic considerations were no longer an aspect in the case of the South Tyrol. 
Although the Western powers attempted to solve the problem of Trieste on the basis of the 
self-determination of the peoples, this argument was no longer applied to the South Tyrol. 
British Foreign Minister Bevin argued that Italy, after all, had to gain something for her 
intervention in the war on the Allies' side. The price was the South Tyrol. Self-
determination was therefore not an option.242 The decision of September 14, 1945, 
decided the Deputies investigating the South Tyrolean case, eliminated all authorization to 
"consider the ethnic aspect of the Problem."243 Also, minority problems had been 
practically excluded from the Paris Peace conference244 and the Western Allies increasingly 
tended to solve these problems within the framework of the actual state dominion. The 
United States and Great Britain came to favor the principle of "assimilation rather than of 
perpetuation of racial minorities. 11245 
A new idea challenged self-determination: the birth of the idea of "human rights." It 
represented the apprehension of minority problems on the ground of sometimes unsolvable 
ethnic mix and the discrepancy between minorities, colonialism, and racism that had 
already concerned the League of Nations during the interwar period:246 The interpretation 
and application of the Atlantic Charter ultimately led to the result that self-determination 
242 Alcock, History, 105. 
243 The Assistant Secretary (Dunn) to the Secreatary of State, March 5, 1946, in Foreign 
Relations, 1946, II:21 Fn 39. 
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now was only considered a means of furthering the development of friendly relations 
among states and to strengthen universal peace. It was secondary to the goal of peace and 
it should be set aside "when its fulfillment would give rise to tension and conflict among 
states."247 The return of the South Tyrol obviously gave rise to tensions between Italy and 
Austria. Neither the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers on June 24, 1946 nor the 
Gruber-De Gasperi Agreement of September 5, 1946 induced a solution of the conflict 
between the two nations. At the end of the peace conference the South Tyrol problem 
remained unsolved. 
247 Pomerance, Self-Determination, 28. 
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A u.~tro-l tal i.an .Agreement* 
[SEFTEMBER 5, 1046.] 
1.-Gernmn-speaking inhabitants of the Bolzano Province and of 
the neighbouring bilingual townships of the Trento Province will be 
assured complete equality of rights with the Italian-5peaking inhabi-
tants, within the framework of special provisions to safeguard the 
ethnical dmrncter and the cultural and economic development of the 
Get·man-speaking element. 
In accordance with legislation already enacted or awaiting enact-
ment the said German-speaking citizens will be granted u1 particular: 
(a) elementary and secondary teachin(J' in the mother-tongue; 
( b) ptirticipation of the German and ~talian la~O'Uages in public 
offic~s tmd official documents, as •vell as in bili11oO'Ual topographic 
nammg; 
( c) the right to re-establish German family names which were 
Itnl ianized in recent vears; 
( d) equality of r1ghts as regards the entering upon public offices, 
with a. Yiew to reaching tl. more appropriate proportion of employ-
ment between the two ethnical groups. 
2.-The populations of the above-mentioned zones will be granted 
the exercise of autonomous legislative and executive regional power. 
The fmme within which the said pro,·isions of tiutonomy will apply, 
will lie (lraftetl in consultation also wirh local represeutati,·e Genua11-
speaking elements. 
;;,-The Italian GO\·ernmeut, with the aim of establishing good 
neighbourhood relations between .\.ustria and Italy. pledges itself, in 
consultation with the .\.ustrian Gon•rnment and within one year from 
the signing of the present Treaty: 
(rt) to re,·ise in a spirit of equity and brmulminJetlness the ques-
tion of the options for citizenship resulting from the rn;m Hitlcr-
J:[ussolini agreements; 
( b) to foul an agreement for the mutual recognition of the rnlidity 
of certain degrees and University diplomas; 
( c) to dra.w up a convention for the free passengers and goods tran-
sit between Northern and Eastern Tyrol both by rail and, to the great-
est possible extent, by road; 
( d) to reach special agreements aimed at facilitating enlarged fron-
tier traffic and local exchanges of certain quantities of characteristic 
products and goods between Austria and Italy. 
•English te:rt as communicated by the Delegations. [Footnote in the source 
text.] 
The Gruber-De Gasperi Agreement of September 5, 1946 
in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, IV:810-l 1. 
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THE WAY TO A SOLUTION: THE SOUTH TYROL 
QUESTION BEFORE THE UN AND THE CONCLUSION OF 
THE "PACKAGE" 
The gentlemen's agreement between Gruber and De Gasperi revealed European 
views oriented toward an international solution. Unfortunately, reality lagged far behind 
the promises made in Paris on September 5, 1946.248 During the following decade the 
Italian Government continuously tried to bypass the Paris Agreement. Italy disragarded the 
provisions of the Paris Agreements concerning the autonomy of its monority in the north 
and made decisions without the consultation of South Tyrolean politicians. During these 
years the South Tyroleans were alone in their struggle for autonomy. Just as after World 
War I, the Austrian Government at this time was not in the position to intervene in favor of 
the South Tyrol. This situation changed progressively after Austria received its 
Sovereignty in 1955 and the Austrian government increased its effort to help the South 
Tyroleans to achieve at least what Italy had promised them in 1946. Italy, however, 
insisted that the South Tyrol was an exclusively Italian domestic problem and forbade any 
interference by outside nations. Consequently, Austria now sought to internationalize the 
problem bringing the South Tyrol question before the United Nations Organizations in both 
1960 and in 1961. Two UN Resolutions forced Italy to accept Austria as a negotiating 
partner. This proved to be the first step toward the South Tyrolean autonomy. 
248 Steininger, "Siidtirolfrage," 5-6. 
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Already in September 1946 the South Tyroleans realized that the Gruber-De 
Gasperi Agreement did not guarantee autonomy for the South Tyrol by itself. The 
Agreement of September 5, 1946 allowed the Italians to create the "Region Trentino-Alto 
Adige" as the area for autonomy. Autonomy for the German-speaking territory alone had 
been one of the South Tyroleans' major objectives. An autonomy for a larger area would 
tip the balance in favor of a larger Italian population and would consequently put the 
German-speaking population in the position of a minority in their own autonomous area. 
Indeed, this was the first step the Italian Government took. On June 27, 1947 the 
constitutional convention decided the establishment of the Region Trentino-Alto Adige 
without prior consultation of South Tyrolean delegates, which had been promised in the 
Paris Agreement. The limited autonomy regulations the Italian government introduced 
during the following months applied to the whole Region. Despite growing South 
Tyrolean protest during the autumn of 1947, the Italian Constitution became effective on 
January 1, 1948 and consequently institutionalized the Region Trentino-Alto Adige as the 
area of autonomy. 249 
At the beginning of 1948, a South Tyrolean delegation achieved small 
improvements regarding the provisions in the Italian Autonomy Statute. The province of 
South Tyrol became a separate electoral district and received administrative autonomy and 
legislative authority over cultural matters. For Italy, the decisions of 1948 represented the 
Statute of Autonomy Italy was prepared to grant the region Trentino-Alto Adige. The 
concessions the Italian government made had their price. Italian threats not to reverse the 
Options of 1939, and the creation of the united region Trentino-Alto Adige forced the head 
of the South Tyrolean delegation to write a letter of agreement to Tommaso Perassi, the 
head of the Italian Commission dealing with South Tyrolean questions. In this letter the 
head of the political representatives of the South Tyrol, Erich Amonn, confirmed that the 
249 Steininger, "Sildtirolfrage," 5. 
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South Tyroleans accepted the Autonomy Statute of 1948 and saw in it the fulfillment of the 
Gruber-De Gasperi Agreement. The Italian Government used this letter to prove 
internationally that their part of the agreement had been fulfilled. Historians and politicians 
have continually argued that the letter written under Italian pressure could not be seen as the 
South Tyroleans' consent to the Italian proposal of Autonomy.250 Indeed, South Tyrolean 
resistance and Rome's reluctance to even implement the provisions of the Autonomy 
Statute of 1948 gradually brought the project to a standstill.251 
The next step in Italy's "policy of fulfillment" of the Paris Agreement was the attack 
on the German language. The Italian Government decided that in the South Tyrol German 
had to be seen only as an "ancillary" language. Therefore, in 1950 the Italian Government 
disregarded Article 1 of the Paris Agreement and made changes regarding South Tyrolean 
educational policy. In 1952, the Italian Government ordered that every domestic 
administrative act had to be in the Italian language.252 Rome also introduced theater 
censorship which claimed that the director of the local radio station in the South Tyrol and 
of the State Archives in Bozen had to be an Italian without knowledge of the German 
language.253 Consequently the German-speaking South Tyroleans were essentially 
excluded from the public sector. This regulation produced absurd results on the local level 
of the South Tyrolean administration. German-speaking communities and towns had to 
communicate among each other in the Italian language although their everyday 
correspondence was almost exclusively based on their Austro-German culture. 254 
Also, government officials tried to obstruct the revision of the Options of 1939 by 
dragging out discussions and delaying the processing of the papers of those who wanted to 
return to the South Tyrol. Additionally, throughout the 1950's generous government 
250 Steininger, "Stidtirolfrage," 6; Ritschel, Diplomatie, 263-264. 
251 Gunther Pallaver, "South Tyrol, The 'Package' and its Ratification," in Politics and Society in 
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programs supported popular housing schemes for Italians and therefore pushed 
immigration of Italians to the South Tyrol.255 As a result, the industrial sector became 
more and more a monopoly of the Italian speaking population, while the German-speaking 
South Tyroleans remained dominant in the agricultural area. 256 The South Tyrolean press 
publicized Italian immigration as the "march of death" from the South, and many South 
Tyroleans compared the measures of the Italian Government with the policies of 
Mussolini's Fascists. Throughout the 1950's the South Tyroleans became extremely 
suspicious of the Italian Government and lost all faith in its sincerity.257 They feared that 
Rome would implement De Gasperi's speech of 1947. On July 20, 1947 De Gasperi had 
given a speech in Trent, the capital of the Trentino, in which he claimed that South 
Tyroleans only wanted autonomy in preparation for reintegration into Austria. He 
mentioned that the Italian Government would consider granting them some sort of 
autonomous status only when the German-speaking inhabitants of the Alto Adige promised 
to give up any irredentist activity.258 
Throughout this whole period the South Tyroleans hoped for international 
assistance. In fact, Great Britain supported the South Tyroleans' fight. Throughout the 
late 1940's the British Government regularly intervened in Rome, trying to speed up the 
negotiations for the South Tyrolean Autonomy. The United States, on the other side, 
continued to assist Italy largely because Italy wanted to enter NATO and because of the 
pressure American-Italians exerted upon the American government.259 The United States 
went so far as to intervene on Italy's behalf with the English Government. At the 
beginning of 1948, while the South Tyrol was in uproar about the proposed Autonomy 
Statute, and British officials urged the government in Rome to fulfil! their promises made in 
255 Steininger, "Si.idtirolfrage," 6; see also: Ritschel, Diplomatie, 276. 
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the Paris Agreement, the American Government appeased their British counterparts by 
declaring that American delegates in Rome had checked the situation and had found that the 
talks were proceeding satisfactorily. 260 During the following years, the South Tyroleans 
learned that the only support they could hope for would have to come from Austria and 
from themselves. 
During the second half of the 1950's the situation changed very rapidly and the 
South Tyroleans changed their conciliatory attitude. Many South Tyroleans had begun to 
question the compromising policy of the "Stidtiroler Volkspartei," or SVP,261 which soon 
after the war established political hegemony on the South Tyrolean political scene. The 
issue that united extremist fronts in the SVP was the party's opposition to the threat of 
Italianization and suppression from Rome. In 1957 a change in the party-leadership 
introduced a new line of action. The old traditional elite in the SVP was replaced by an 
"extremely nationalistic wing of the SVP." Yet the change was not as sudden as some 
historians have pointed out.262 The first public outcry of the South Tyroleans' discontent 
over Rome's attitude towards the minority in the north received voice in a speech by the 
SVP representative Dr. Otto von Guggenberg held in Rome on August 1951. In this 
speech Guggenberg complained about the many actions of the Italian Government during 
the past to suppress the South Tyroleans' culture and language. In the name of the SVP 
and the South Tyroleans, he abstained on the vote of confidence for the Italian Government 
because Italy obstructed the process of reintegration of those who had left the South Tyrol 
after the Hitler-Mussolini Agreement in 1939 and now wanted to return to their home-
country. He did so because the few administrative concessions Italy had made to the South 
Tyroleans in the Statute of Autonomy in 1948 were gradually taken back or revised through 
260 The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Italy, January 16, 1948, in Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1947 (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1973), II: 1352. 
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governmental interference.263 Later in autumn 1953, the South Tyroleans accused the 
Italian Government of supporting "systematic immigration" of Italians to their province. 
On September 29, 1953, the South Tyrolean newspaper Dolomiten maintained that Italy's 
immigration policy aimed at gradually supressing the South Tyroleans by flooding the 
region with Italians.264 
Significant for the South Tyroleans' change in attitude was also the Trieste issue in 
1953. With the slogan "self-determination" the Italian Government demanded a plebiscite 
for Trieste and re-integration of this territory to Italy. The reaction of the South Tyrolean 
was as expected. They supported the government's demand on the international level, but 
at the same time they underlined that self-determination and the execution of a plebiscite 
should be equally applied to the South Tyrol. Italian authorities denied any connection 
between the two issues. In their eyes the Trieste issue was an open question which needed 
a settlement whereas the question of the South Tyrol had been setteled a long time ago. 
Trieste returned to Italy. The notes to the western Allies written by the SVP and the 
government in Vienna were ignored. 265 The Italian press defended the decision with the 
following words: "The principle of self-determination is a big principle but it is not 
universally applicable .... There are other principles which have to be taken into 
consideration, especially the geographic situation ... From the geographic circumstances 
follow economic circumstances, which in the case of the South Tyrol are naturally oriented 
to the South."266 As a result of these events on April 9, 1954 the SVP issued a 
memorandum in which the party put down the demands of the South Tyroleans and urged 
the government in Rome to open negotiations. Yet, throughout this whole period the 
Italian Government ignored the SVP's proposals.267 As South Tyrolean politician Friedl 
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Volgger explained, Rome did not expect the SVP to go into opposition and became 
accordingly hostile.268 
Alcock explains that during these years the SVP did resist and criticize Italian policy 
of the South Tyrol, but the party was challenged by two political realities. On the one 
hand, the SVP saw the need to cooperate with the regional government in Trent and Rome. 
On the other hand, the South Tyroleans' dissatisfaction with Rome's policy forced the 
party to increasingly take a firmer stand and to revise its attitude. Therefore the SVP's rigid 
attitude of the second half of the 1950's resulted from a development that had started 
already during the late 1940's and beginning 1950's. By 1955, the party realized that they 
had already done everything possible to cooperate with the Italian Government and that this 
policy of conciliation would not lead to satisfactory results.269 
In 1957 SVP party leader Silvius Magnago's policy toward Rome became 
increasingly aggressive, and with this tum, the South Tyrolean political scene was no 
longer open for discussions on a national level. By now, the situation in the South Tyrol 
was extremely tense and the South Tyroleans prepared for public demonstrations to attract 
international attention. Italian authorities, fearing reaction by the Italian-speaking 
population, had forbidden demonstrations in Bozen. Yet, on November 17, 35,000 
German-speaking South Tyroleans gathered at the castle of Sigmundskron, a few miles 
outside Bozen. During this rally Magnago demanded the "Release from Trent" and 
"Protection from 48 Millions [of Italians]. "270 The demonstration also passed a resolution 
in which the South Tyroleans demanded "that Austria intercede at the international level so 
that the right of self-determination, anchored in the Atlantic Charter, may be granted."271 
On February 4, 1958, the South Tyroleans presented a draft to Rome requesting autonomy 
for the province of South Tyrol. Yet the draft was never discussed. The final step 
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followed almost a year later. In contradiction with previous promises, on January 16, 
1959, the Italian Government deprived the South Tyroleans of the possibility of 
intervention in governmental popular housing schemes. In open protest, the SVP left the 
Regional Government. 272 Henceforth, the SVP chose to open an intensive press campaign 
in Austria and all over Europe. "Autonomy or Self-Determination" was the theme of the 
propaganda. Along with the outcry in European newspapers went a renewed outbreak of 
violence in the South Tyrol. Indeed, even the New York Times asked whether the South 
Tyrol was about to become a new "Cyprus in the foothills of the Alps. 11273 
The South Tyroleans' change of attitude towards the end of the 1950's was partially 
caused by the increasing intervention of the Austrian Government. After World War II, 
Austria had been in no position to help the South Tyroleans. The Allies occupied Austria 
for almost another decade, an economic crisis shook the country, and the Cold War 
destabilized the Viennese government. Moreover, the endless waiting for the state treaty, 
without which Austria had no freedom of action, further delayed intervention.274 Italy, on 
the other hand, became increasingly important for the Western Allies. In 1948, it became a 
member of the OEEC and in 1949 a member of NATO. Therefore, while Austria was an 
occupied country, Italy could rely on the support of its Western Allies. Not surprisingly, 
Austrian queries about the progress of the discussions on the South Tyrol and its 
interventions on behalf of the South Tyroleans in Rome did not lead to Italian reaction. The 
government in Rome merely insisted that the South Tyrol remained a domestic problem and 
succeeded in keeping discussions on the South Tyrol off the international level. 275 
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Finally on May 15, 1955 Austria signed its State Treaty. In October 1955 the 
country was liberated from the occupation forces, and in December 1955 Austria joined the 
United Nations Organization. Its new independence, for the first time since 1945, allowed 
Austria's foreign policy to concentrate on the South TyroI.276 The Italian press rejoiced 
that with the acceptance of neutrality in the State Treaty, Austria had finally accepted the 
Brenner frontier and had given up every right to interfere in the South Tyrol question. Yet, 
the Austrian Government did not follow these allegiations. The Paris Agreement of 
September 5, 1946, had given Austria the right to act on behalf of the South Tyrol. With 
the State Treaty Austria regained the necessary freedom of action in international politics. 
After 1955, the Austrian Government increased its efforts to force the fulfillment of the 
Gruber-De Gasperi agreement. Until 1955, the Austrian government's actions had been 
limited to support of South Tyrolean policy, now its intervention became more 
aggressive.277 The diplomatic battle between Italy and Austria over the South Tyrol issue 
began with an Italian memorandum on July 9, 1956. The Italian Government stated that the 
provisions of the Gruber-De Gasperi Agreement had been fulfilled and only minor details 
were still pending. While the Italian Government was willing to accept Austrian 
suggestions concerning a better application of the Agreement, it would not allow Austria to 
make accusations of a general nature concerning the South TyroI.278 On July 21, Austrian 
Chancellor Julius Raab replied to the Italian memorandum. He announced that the Austrian 
Government would submit its suggestions, but he also accused the Italian Government of 
not fulfilling the Agreement of September 5, 1946. A written exchange of notes followed 
between the two countries with some diplomatic discussions for the following years. But 
the efforts of the Austrian Government amounted to little. Therefore, Austrian 
representatives increasingly aimed at internationalizing the South Tyrolean question and 
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toward the end of the 1950's decided to bring the problem before the General Assembly of 
the United Nation Organization.279 
By the end of the 1950's the United States and Great Britain realized that indeed the 
Austrian Government would bring the South Tyrol problem before the UN. They exerted 
pressure on the Austrian government and tried to convince Vienna that nobody desired a 
discussion of the issue during a United Nation's General Assembly meeting. They further 
urged the government in Rome to agree to bilateral negotiations. The American press 
announced in 1959 that the US would not interfere in any way in the conflict between 
Austria and Italy because they were afraid that the issue would become a plaything between 
East and West. They recommended the two nations should solve their discord in front of 
the Council of Europe or the International Court of Justice which on September 17, 1959, 
had created the framework to handle conflicts of that sort. In the "European Convention 
for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes" of September 17, the Council of Europe had 
determined that international disputes between nations should be settled through the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague or through the establishment of a court of 
arbitration. 280 
Yet, both the Austrian Government and the SVP had little confidence in a Council 
of Europe dominated by Italy's NATO and Common Market partners.281 Therefore, 
against the advice of the United States and Great Britain, on September 21, 1959, Austrian 
foreign minister, Bruno Kreisky mentioned the South Tyrol problem for the first time at the 
General Assembly of the UN. Afterwards Kreisky declared that "now eighty-two nations 
know that the South Tyrol problem is a real problem." During the following months, 
despite British and American intervention, which aimed at convincing Rome and Vienna to 
open bilateral negotiations, the Austrian Government resorted to stubborn resistance. By 
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now Austria was determined to discuss the problem during the next meeting of the General 
Assembly although Italy, in January 1960 had agreed to discuss the problem at the ICJ.282 
This step was not without risk. As the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera announced on 
September 20, 1960 nobody was sure whether in view of Khrushchev's speech before the 
UN "the discussions of the situation in the South Tyrol would arouse laughter or 
indignation."283 The New York Herald Tribune announced that amid the world's crisis 
and especially the Congo crisis, the South Tyrol question seemed "woefully out of 
place. 0 284 Yet, the Austrian mission proved successful. The General Assembly discussed 
the matter and, against the desires of the NATO members, on October 31, 1960 the UN 
issued the Resolution VII Res 1497/XV. This Resolution recognized the validity of the 
Paris Agreement and urged both Austria and Italy to discuss all differences about the Paris 
Agreement. If negotiations should fail the two nations should take advantage of the 
international courts of arbitration. Consequently the South Tyrol problem was no longer a 
domestic affair of Italy and Austria gained the official right to intervene on behalf of the 
South Tyroleans. 285 Also, with this statement the UN recognized that the matter should be 
discussed by the UN and thus opened the possibility to return to that body if needed. 286 
But the Resolution of the UN was not a total failure of Italian politics. The decision of the 
UN in 1960 denied the South Tyrol international support for self-determination, it merely 
recognized the South Tyroleans' effort to gain autonomy. 287 Yet, the Resolution of the 
UN opened the way to a solution of the South Tyrolean problem. 
During the following months the foreign ministers of the two states met several 
times. Again, despite the intervention of the United States and Great Britain, the 
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negotiations proceeded fruitlessly.288 By now tensions had mounted in the South Tyrol. 
Already in 1956 and 1957, a series of bomb attacks and the subsequent arrest of fourteen 
South Tyroleans aggravated the situation. 289 When the meetings of the foreign ministers in 
1961 failed, intensified terrorist attacks destroyed a series of South Tyrolean fascist 
symbols and buildings. The bomb attacks reached a climax on June 12, 1961, the Herz 
Jesu Nacht, a former national holiday of the Habsburg Monarchy. That night, which 
entered history as the "Firenight," fifty-six high-voltage poles were bombed which put the 
industrial complex in Bozen out of operation. The bomb attacks continued for the 
following years and increasingly, Italian security and armed forces were the objective of the 
attack. July 25, 1967, when a bomb killed four people, marked the bloody conclusion of 
the bomb attacks during the 1960's. Throughout the whole period 346 attacks with 
nineteen dead and several wounded shattered the South Tyrol. The foremost aim of the 
attackers was self-determination for the South Tyrol. Also, the aggressors wanted to make 
the South Tyrol a world issue. 290 
The terrorist attacks indeed had double-edged implications. While the SVP 
disclaimed any knowledge of and sympathy for the bomb attacks, they continuously caused 
a more restrictive policy from Rome and jeopardized sympathy for the South Tyrol in the 
world. On the other hand, when negotiations came to a stop, the bombs succeeded in the 
resumption of direct contacts between the SVP and the Italian Government.291 Moreover, 
the Italian authority's reaction to the bomb attacks did not find international understanding. 
The Italian Government claimed that West German authorities trained the terrorists. Italian 
police arrested several South Tyroleans without final proof of their guilt. Austria accused 
Italy of subjecting the terrorists to unfair trials and unjustly sentencing them for murder. 
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Alcock argues that due to the terrorist agitation in 1960 the international body politic 
realized "the alarming degree to which mutual antagonism had established itself' in the 
South Tyrol.292 At the beginning 1960's the bomb attacks succeeded in attracting 
international attention. The world feared a new, violent trouble spot in the heart of Europe. 
After the negotiations between Italy and Austria at the beginning of 1961 produced 
no result, the Austrian Government again decided to bring the South Tyrol question before 
the UN. On November 18, 1961, the General Assembly of the UN renewed the resolution 
of the previous year and finally Italy was willing to seek a compromise. 293 Throughout 
1960 the Italian Government had to deal with a severe political crisis. On September 1, 
1961, the opposition in the Italian Government had accepted the Austrian suggestion of 
establishing an arbitrary commission and had called the "Commission of Nineteen" into 
being. After the second resolution of the UN the Commission, consisting of eleven 
Italians, seven German-speaking South Tyroleans and one Ladin, became the official level 
of negotiation, it now undertook the deliberation of a statute of autonomy for the German-
speaking minority in northern Italy.294 The Commission delivered its final report on April 
10, 1964. Although the report did not fulfill the SVP's demands completely, it functioned 
as the guideline for the negotiations between Italy and Austria for the following two years. 
At the end of August 1966, Italy finally presented its "entire offer," a set of provisions for 
South Tyrolean Autonomy which would later receive the name ·"Package." The two 
nations and the South Tyroleans now disagreed only on the international recognition of the 
"Package. 11 295 Due to more bombings in the South Tyrol, an Italian veto against the 
negotiations with Austria, and a severe political crisis in Italy, the negotiations over this 
point stretched out for three years. Kurt Waldheim, Austrian minister of foreign affairs, 
and his Italian counterpart Pietro Nenni, finally reached an agreement in May 1969. During 
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the meeting of the ministers of the members of the European Committee on May 13,1969, 
Nenni accepted Waldheim's proposal of an "Operational Calendar," a set of regulations 
which determined the deadlines for Italy's fulfillment of the provision of the "Package." 
Although the "Operational Calendar" did not give specific dates, both nations expected the 
provisions to be fulfilled in the course of four years. 296 
Then on August 22 1969, the Italian Government presented the final version of the 
"Package" to the SVP. It consisted of 137 points which the Italian Government agreed to 
carry out to South Tyrolean satisfaction. Point 137 promised the revision of the Autonomy 
Statute of 1948. It included the 137 points of the "Package" and the creation of a 
subcommittee for South Tyrolean affairs which would supervise the fulfillment of the 
"Package" and deal with upcoming problems in the South Tyrol. The quarrel before the 
UN would be terminated as soon as the Austrian Government submitted the 
Streitbeilegungserkliirung, a declaration which recognized that Italy had fulfilled the 
"Package" and that therefore the quarrel between Italy and Austria was over.297 
After arduous discussions the SVP accepted the "Package" which became effective 
on January 20, 1971. The most important regulation of the new Statute of Autonomy was 
the settlement of the territorial question. Rome retained the region Trentino-Alto Adige but 
weakened regional competencies considerably. According to article three of the Statute of 
Autonomy, the two provinces of Trentino and Alto Adige have authority over regional 
administration. Therefore, in the region Trentino-Alto Adige the majority of the inhabitants 
would still be Italian-speaking, but their administrations were divided into two 
administrative, self-sufficient units. In the case of the South Tyrol this meant that a 
German-speaking majority would be in charge of provincial administration. Many South 
Tyroleans interpreted this paragraph as the "Release from Trent. 11298 Further, the 
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"Package" provided the South Tyroleans with a variety of competencies which were 
supposed to "protect and maintain their ethnic and cultural uniqueness." The South 
Tyrolean administration received large concessions in the area of public housing schemes, 
hunting and fishing, national parks, road construction and traffic regulation, civil service, 
communication systems, tourism, forestry, welfare system, and school constructions. The 
"Package" also took note of the Ladin-speaking population and granted them special rights 
and their own schools. The German language received equal status with the Italian 
language in regard to administrative matters in the South Tyrol. Consequently, not only the 
German-speaking population was required to learn Italian as a second language but the 
Italian-speaking population had to be taught the German language also. The regional 
administration was allowed to pass laws and issue regulations as long as they did not 
conflict or contradict national laws. 299 
Fifty years after South Tyrol's incorporation into Italy, the South Tyrol question 
finally seemed to have been solved. The solution represented a compromise between Rome 
and Bozen. Bozen received administrative and economic autonomy and Rome assured the 
German-speaking South Tyroleans of an almost undisturbed development of their social 
and cultural life. Rome, on the other hand, secured its influence in the South Tyrolean 
administration by reserving a certain percentage of governmental and provincial jobs in the 
South Tyrol for Italian-speaking South Tyroleans and it maintained its right to support the 
development of the Italian-speaking population of the region. Throughout the 1970's the 
Italian government indeed began to fulfill gradually the provisions of the "Package." 
Finally the South Tyroleans' efforts to bring autonomy discussions to an end seemed to be 
successful. 
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At the end of the decade, however, some of the most important provisions of the 
"Package" were still under discussion. The main issue was the regulation concerning 
"governmental authority over organization and coordination." This regulation allowed 
governmental influence in local administration if national interests or security appeared to 
be in danger. Already in 1970 and 1975 it had become effective for other regions in Italy. 
By the beginning of the 1980's, governmental decrees began to introduce this regulation to 
the South Tyrol. SVP representatives refused to accept this interference and throughout the 
1980's managed to restrict the practical application of the rule. Additionally, the Italian 
Government refused to recognize the clause over the international recognition of the 
"Package." Therefore, during the 1980's the negotiations between Rome and Bozen came 
to a standstiII.300 Again the lines began to harden. On April 12, 1986, radical anti-Italian 
South Tyroleans disturbed a meeting of SVP delegates and, carrying banners around the 
room, demanded: "South Tyrol in danger! The Package is dead! Freedom for South 
Tyrol!" Again, minor bomb attacks aroused national as well as international attention and 
jeopardized Magnago's Realpolitik.301 Then, in September 1991 the SVP delivered an 
ultimatum to Rome. The South Tyrolean party threatened to call for Austrian assistance 
and bring the South Tyrol question before the UN again if the "Package" was not fulfilled 
by November 23, 1991. This time Rome reacted. By November, Prime Minister Giulio 
Andreotti pushed the last four autonomy regulations through parliament in Rome. Three 
times during these discussions he had to ask for a vote of confidence. The discussions 
about the international recognition of the "Package" continued through April 1992. Finally, 
on April 22, the day of his resignation, Giulio Andreotti, sent a note to the Austrian 
Government in which he announced that the "Package" had been concluded and that Italy 
would agree to its international recognition. On June 19, 1992, after the SVP and the 
300 Steininger, "Si.idtirolfrage," 20-21. 
301 Piero Agostini, Alto Adige, la Convivenza Rinviata: Nevrosi da Confine dal Patto di Londra 
a/la Rivolta degli Schutzen (Bozen: Praxis 3, 1986), 15-16. 
The Way to a Solution: The South Tyrol Question before the UN and the Conclusion of the "Package" 
95 
Austrian Government had accepted the Italian note, Austria sent a declaration to the UN in 
which it announced termination of the dispute over the South Tyrol between Italy and 
Austria. 302 
Seventy-three years after the first attempts of granting the South Tyrol autonomy, 
the German-speaking minority in the north of Italy succeeded in securing the ethnic, 
cultural, social, economic, and political uniqueness of their homeland. After a twenty-year 
battle with the government in Rome, in 1992, while Italy was drifting towards the most 
severe crisis after 1945, the South Tyroleans finally managed to reach terms acceptable to 
the Italian Government. During the post-war period, the South Tyroleans had gradually 
learned that an improvement of their situation could not be realized through reliance on 
international intervention. On the contrary, the SVP and Magnago soon realized that the 
South Tyroleans had to fight for their goals by themselves. The only support they could 
hope for was intervention by Austria. The Austrian government's backing of the South 
Tyroleans brought the question before an international body and helped find a way to a 
solution. Austria's negotiations with Italy ultimately, in 1969, resulted in Italy's promise 
to give up Italian rights of governmental sovreignty in favor of a Statute of Autonomy for 
the German-speaking minority in the north. During the 1970's and 1980's the South 
Tyroleans negotiated with Rome over the actual implementation of the provisions for the 
South Tyrol adapting them to the particular needs of the South Tyrolean population. 
Austria's backup and the fact that Bruno Kreisky had succeded in turning the South Tyrol 
question into an internationally recognized dispute, helped South Tyrolean representatives 
in Rome to fulfill gradually what the "Package" had promised. During these years the 
South Tyroleans, as Gtinther Pallaver puts it, very successfully pursued a path of 
continuous exchange with Rome, offering loyalty in exchange for concessions. If 
concessions were not given, the more radical wings of the SVP threatened to ask again for 
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Austria's help and to demand self-determination before an international body. Now the 
quest for self-determination was less a demand for re-integration into Austria but rather for 
independence from any state authority.303 
The Gruber-De Gasperi Agreement of September 5, 1946 laid the foundations for 
this development. Although it was severely criticized by all sides, after the conclusion of 
the "Package" in 1992, South Tyrolean politicians had to admit that ultimately the 
Agreement had served its purpose better than anybody could have anticipated in 1946. It 
opened the way for the South Tyroleans' negotiations with Rome and although the 
discussions dragged on for decades, the vagueness of the Agreement allowed the 
adaptation of autonomy demands to present-day needs. In 1992, after the General 
Secretary of the UN, Butros Butros Ghali received Austria's declaration about the 
settlement of the dispute on the South Tyrol, he underlined the significance of this step and 
pointed out that the outstanding South Tyrolean Autonomy should serve as an example for 
other minorities all over the world. 304 He did not mention that ultimately the South 
Tyroleans had not received their Autonomy Statute through the help of international bodies 
or the application of human-rights principles supporting minorities. They had gained their 
unique status by persistently negotiating with the government in Rome. 
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CONCLUSION 
For almost three quarters of a century the South Tyroleans had fought for the 
preservation of their ethnic identity. The idea of self-determination introduced by 
Woodrow Wilson in 1918 legitimized their quest for protection of their ethnicity and 
language. Yet, the peace of Paris of 1919 denied the South Tyrolens' the right to self-
determination and incorporated the German-speaking territory of the South Tyrol into Italy. 
During the following two decades Italian fascism eliminated the South Tyroleans' right to 
struggle for their cultural identity. Mussolini's ideology pursued the ltalianization of the 
South Tyrol. The German-speaking minority in Italy could not even hope for help from the 
German national socialists in the north who during the l 930's renounced the South Tyrol 
for an alliance with Italy. During the fascist era minorities were not a problem for the 
dictatorial states. Minority rights were simply ignored. Only the peace conference in 
1945/46 gave the European minorities a new chance to fight for their protection. The South 
Tyroleans hoped again that the peacemakers would allow a return· of the South Tyrol to 
Austria. During the peace negotiations, however, political realities in Europe changed and 
the rising conflict between East and West urged the Western powers to confirm the decision 
of 1919 and to maintain the South Tyrol within Italy. Although the Allied powers 
recognized the ethnic difference of the South Tyroleans from the Italian people, they also 
explicitly forbade the application of self-determination to the German-speaking minority on 
Italy's northern frontier. Consequently the decision of 1946 confronted the South 
Tyroleans with the need to negotiate for a different kind of self-determination, for a 
determination of their fate within the Italian state. 
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Wilson's principle of self-determination had contributed in raising the hope of the 
South Tyroleans that the predicaments of the secret London Treaty could be reversed. The 
South Tyroleans hoped in vain that they would be granted the right of self-determination. 
Wilson's idealism and his unability to perceive European realities, in many ways 
contributed to the future political fate of the South Tyroleans. Wilson was unaware of the 
profoundity of ethnic conflicts in Europe. Furthermore, in the case of the South Tyrol he 
made a decision without knowing the political and ethnic situation in northern Italy . He 
also believed that with the yielding of the South Tyrol he could buy the Italians' withdrawal 
from its demands on the Yugoslavian question. Idealistically Wilson hoped that ultimately 
the League of Nations would prevent the outbreak of national conflicts and would 
contribute to a stable Europe and a long-lasting peace. 
The League of Nations, however, proved to be a very weak, artificial construction. 
During the 1920's and 1930's this international body was not able to diminish the impact of 
nationalism and to strenghten the importance of international cooperation. Nationalism 
flourished as never before and led to the establishment of both the Italian and the German 
dictatorial state in central Europe. Ethnic minorities did not have a place in these states and 
nothing was farther removed from the fascist ideologies than the idea of self-determination. 
For Italian fascism therefore the German-speaking South Tyrol became a testcase. A 
successful Italianization of the territory would prove the correctness of the fascist ideology 
and contribute to domestic conosolidation. In addition, Italianization of the South Tyrol 
would prevent international claims of a return of the area to the German-speaking world. 
For German and Austrian nationalism the South Tyrol was a matter of the heart. 
The return of the South Tyroleans to the German-speaking world became a major issue in 
German and Austrian public opinion. German national socialism demanded the revision of 
the treaty of Versaille and the incorporation of all territories inhabited by Germans into a 
German state. But only initially did the Nazis involve the inclusion of the South Tyrol in 
the German Reich in their demands. The national socialist leader Adolf Hitler gave priority 
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to an alliance with fascist Italy. The South Tyrol should not be the source of conflict 
between the two ideologically close nations. Therefore, he renounced to the South Tyrol 
and to all claims of German national socialism to this territory. Hence, Hilter gave up his 
ideology of the unification of all German territory and submitted the South Tyrol to political 
necessities. Together with the Italian fascist leader Benito Mussolini, Hitler aimed at a 
different solution of the problem. In 1939 the two dictators gave the South Tyroleans the 
possibility to emigrate to the German Reich and become German citizens. Those South 
Tyroleans who decided to remain in their home-country automatically agreed to become 
loyal Italian citizens. 
Ironically the outbreak of World War II prevented the dismemberment of the South 
Tyrol. War actions and war necessities slowed down the process of the transfere of the 
South Tyrolean population to the German Reich. In 1943, when the Nazis occupied large 
parts of Italy, which by then had surrendered to the Allies, emigration of the South 
Tyroleans to Germany stopped altogether. With German occupation the South Tyroleans 
seemed to have achieved their aim. Again, the South Tyrol was under German political 
dominion. Yet, the following two years of South Tyrolean rejoicing with Nazi rule became 
a major obstacle for a favorable consideration of a return of the South Tyrol to Austria 
during the peace negotiations in 1945/46. 
The end of the war indeed gave the South Tyroleans a chance to achieve an 
internationally recognized reincorporation of their territory into Austria. Until autumn 1945 
the major allied powers seemed determined to put right what the Wilsonian peace had done 
wrong in the case of the South Tyrol. The South Tyrol was supposed to return to Austria 
because the population was undeniably of Austro-German culture and tradition and because 
a return of that territory could support the psycological and economic reconstruction of the 
Austrian state. Yet, a change in the international political situation ultimately prevented the 
execution of these intentions. The war-alliance between the four allied powers broke up 
and the European nations drifted towards their post-war constellation of nations influenced 
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by the West and nations influenced by Soviet Russia. Austria, the country that demanded 
the return of the South Tyrol, was one of the weakest nations during this time. Austria's 
political and economic future seemed unpredictable and for a long time it seemed lost to the 
Soviet sphere of influence. Therefore, already in Autumn 1945 the Western Allies 
withdrew from their standpoint of supporting the cession of the South Tyrol to Austria. 
Also, the idea of self-determination of the peoples had experienced considerable 
change. Self-determination was no longer a guiding principle of the peace negotiations. 
On the contrary, the Western Allies came to favor the idea of solving minority problems 
without changing the frontiers of a nation. Minorities were supposed to receive special 
rights and privileges from the hosting state. During the peace negotiations of 1946 the 
Austrian representatives recognized that the attitude of the major powers towards minorities 
had changed and therefore made an effort to come to terms with the Italian government 
through bilateral agreements which should guarantee the free development of the German-
speaking population in northern Italy. The result of these negotiations was the Gruber-De 
Gasperi Agreement of September 5, 1945, which became the cornerstone of a South 
Tyrolean autonomy. Although the agreement showed many weaknesses, it provided the 
South Tyroleans with the right to negotiate for a protection of their particular needs and it 
allowed Austria to function as a guarding nation for the South Tyrol. 
The events of the two decades following World War II showed that Italy, as so 
many other European nations, was not yet ready to allow the separate development of a 
minority within its borders. While the South Tyroleans fought for an implementation of 
autonomy regulations as promised in Paris in 1946 the Italian government repeatedly 
obstructed South Tyrolean autonomy through new interpretations of the Paris agreement 
and through national legislation which invalidated the regulations of Paris. Therefore the 
South Tyroleans with Austria's backing resorted to a plea before the UN to force Italy to 
recognize the South Tyroleans right for autonomy. The two UN resolutions issued in 1960 
and 1961 merely urged Italy to open negotiations with the Austrian government to bring the 
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question of the South Tyrol to a satisfactory solution. Yet, the discussion of the South 
Tyrol issue before the UN also resulted in an international recognition of the South Tyrol 
problem. 
Consequently, during the following years the Italians, the South Tyroleans, and the 
Austrians negotiated over a set of regulations which would protect the German-speaking 
population on Italy's northern border and guarantee the South Tyroleans free developmet 
within Italy. The draft of autonomy of 1969, the "Package," indeed promised the South 
Tyroleans that they would be allowed to determine their own cultural, administrative, and 
political fate. It took the Italian government another twenty-three years to finalize the 
regulations of the "Package." Yet, in the end, the South Tyroleans received an autonomy 
which institutionalized the free development of the German-speaking minority. 
Throughout this whole period conflicting interpretations of self-determination had 
largely contributed to mounting tensions. When Wilson proclaimed that all peoples had the 
right to determine their own fate, he hoped to support the creation of a democratic structure 
in Europe and wanted that the Western Allies recognized this idea as a major moral desire 
of all nations. For the peoples living in Europe's complexity of ethnic groups, however, 
self-determination meant liberation from a state authority which was not identifiable with 
their own ethnicity, their culture, and their language. To the South Tyrol this right for self-
determination or the right for re-integration into a state toward which the South Tyroleans 
felt cultural empathy was denied not only in 1918. Hitler in the case of the South Tyrol 
disregarded his ideology of unifying all German-speaking territories into one German 
Reich and sold the South Tyrolean territory to his ideological mentor Mussolini. In 1945 
the strive for economic wealth and the fear of enlarged Soviet influence overcame ethnic 
considerations. Ever since World War II, the world's legislative bodies tried to solve 
minority problems by granting them protection through national legislation. Finally, this 
idea also concerned the South Tyroleans. In the 1960's the decision of the UN in regard to 
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the South Tyrol was based on this idea of autonomy and supported the process of self-
determination of the South Tyroleans within the Italian state. 
Since 1919 the principle of self-determination had been transformed from a political 
or moral duty into a legal "right" of peoples. Self-determination was supposed to become 
an international norm which overruled all international legal norms. But the ethnographic 
complexity of Europe did not allow all minorities to take part of the principle of self-
determination. To avoid forcible assimilation for such minorities the major powers found 
other solutions, such as autonomy, minority rights, the right of option, the forced transfer 
of populations, and guarantees of non-discrimination. 305 Almost all of these solutions 
were at some point adopted in the South Tyrol. Ultimately, the influence of international 
law and international bodies did not help considerably in solving the problem. International 
interference merely provided the South Tyroleans with the right to negotiate for their own 
protection. The South Tyroleans achieved self-determination through long, exhausting 
discussions with Rome, constantly in fear of the Italian government's attempts to 
undermine their efforts and continuously threatening with a plea for support to the Austrian 
government. 
For a long time after 1919 the South Tyroleans did not have the possibility to revert 
to such measures. Neither in 1919, nor in 1945 the Austrian government was in any 
position to come to South Tyrol's help. Each time the Italian government expressed its 
goodwill to come to satisfying terms with its German-speaking minority in the north. After 
the early 1920's fascism prevented the implementation of any government support of the 
South Tyroleans. Italy's treatment of the South Tyrol question after the Peace Conference 
in 1946, however, is less understandable. Historian Rolf Steininger argued that the Italian 
government's political handling of issue was not laudable for a democratic state.306 
Indeed, with the obstruction of the implementation of the guarantees given in the Gruber-
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De Gasperi agreement the Italian government opened the way to the endless discussions 
that only ended in 1993. During this time, however, the South Tyrolean representatives 
had the chance to adapt the autonomy to present-day needs and ultimately achieved an 
autonomy that protected the uniqueness of their people much better than neither an 
agreement in 1919 nor in 1945 could have anticipated. 
Today, the South Tyroleans are among the best protected minorities in Europe. 
They determine their own political future and administer their province by themselves. The 
schools in the South Tyrol are either in the German or in the Italian language. 
Economically the province flourishes due to its uniqueness which attrackts thousands of 
both Italian and German-speaking tourists every year. Although sometimes Italian-
speaking and German-speaking inhabitants guard each other with suspicion the tendencies 
to live together, rather than to live side by side, increase steadily. The South Tyrolean 
autonomy which provides the German-speaking minority in Italy with the possibility of 
self-government and ethnic protection, could indeed become an example to many other 
European minorities. Their case could help solving the various problems arising in post-
cold war Europe where many minorities, whose rights had been suppressed for decades, 
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